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Part 1 INTRODUCTION 
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1 Introduction 
 
 
The overarching research question asked in this thesis is whether performance 
management can facilitate organisational intelligence in governmental organisations. 
The analysis is based on clinical research into a local government experience in which 
the performance management-system “the Balanced Scorecard” was implemented over 
a period of five years, 1996-2001. The thesis narrates and compares the parallel 
change experiences of functional units covering a wide range of local governmental 
service activities, within the context of Larvik Municipality in Norway.  
 Inspired by March and Olsen’s distinction between two fundamental processes 
of organisational intelligence, the analytical focus of this thesis is twofold. The first 
question is to what extent the balanced scorecard-approach can facilitate management 
control; the second is to what extent it can facilitate organisational learning. 
Performance management is among the most controversial issues in the 
theoretical field of public management today. This academic interest reflects the fact 
that among the most notable changes that have occurred in the public sectors of a 
number of western countries over the last 20 years has been a strong and prevailing 
interest in how to implement performance management systems. These are systems 
aiming to improve organisational rules and routines involving expenditure planning, 
financial management, audit, and evaluation in governmental organisations. 
Performance management is central both to the Financial Management Initiative 
(1982) and the Next Steps Initiative (1988) in the UK. Likewise to the persistent 
momentum behind implementation of the Government Results and Performance Act 
and the Bush Administration’s challenges to better integrate the managerial processes 
of program planning, budgeting, and evaluation in the US (Hyndman and Eden 
2000:176, Barzelay and Thompson, forthcoming).  
This thesis, however, concentrates on local governmental organisations, where 
reforms pursuing performance management have been particularly important (Kloot 
and Martin 2000:231-232). For the Scandinavian countries this is first and foremost 
evident in the extensive local implementation (Naschold 1996). In 2000, 71,2 percent 
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of Norwegian municipalities reported that they used performance management in 
“some or all areas of service activity”. 24,7 percent claimed to use it in “all areas” 
(The Municipality Database, Ministry of Municipalities and Regional Affairs).  
The phrase “performance management” no doubt means different things to 
different people. For the purposes of this thesis, performance management is defined 
as a system for managing organisational operations, in which “traditional” means of 
public management, such as vertical centralisation and “before-the-fact” rules and 
procedures, is replaced with vertical decentralisation and “after-the-fact” control 
mechanisms (Thompson 1993. See section 2.2 below). Used as a management system 
within an organisation, performance management takes the form of a management 
accounting system. For the purposes of this thesis, a management accounting system is 
defined as a performance management-based system used for “the process of 
identification, measurement, accumulation, analysis, preparation, interpretation and 
communication of information that assists executives in fulfilling organizational 
objectives (…) - a formal mechanism for gathering and communicating data for the 
ends of aiding and coordinating collective decisions in the light of the overall goals or 
objectives of an organisation (Horngren, Sundem and Stratton 1996).  
The Balanced Scorecard is a high-profiled, “modern” management accounting 
system, presented as especially suited for public – and other not-for-profit 
organisations, as well as knowledge-based organisations in the private sectors (Kaplan 
and Norton 2001). 
Like most themes under the umbrella of so-called New Public Management 
(NPM), performance management and its applicability to governmental organisations 
is subject to much debate. This Tower of Babel is made up of a range of contributors: 
stakeholders like politicians, public managers and unions, as well as  theorists from 
various academic fields. Consequently, the controversy over performance management 
is rather “messy”. One can easily get the impression that the field is divided into two 
camps, one positive and one negative; both making broad claims, based as much on 
rhetoric as on strong and relevant empirical support (Øgård 2000:34ff).  
Central in the large negative camp in the Nordic countries are Røvik (1998) and 
Rombach (1991). Rombach’s key claim is that that the performance management 
3 
Performance Management and Organisational Intelligence 
doctrine is based on assumptions valid only in the private sector, not in the public 
sector (Øgård 2000:35). I will return to Rombach’s claims in chapter six. With his 
focus on decentralisation, delegation and efficiency in public services, many will 
perceive of Rune Sørensen (1999, 2001) as one of the few notable social scientists in 
the positive camp in Norway. 
What is clear, is that this polarisation hampers the academic fields of public 
administration and public management. And moreover, it means that public sector 
executives do not benefit sufficiently from research that analyse experiences where 
organisational leaders have concentrated on implementing performance management 
systems (Barzelay 2001). 
This thesis attempts to contribute to moving the field of public management 
away from such polarisation. This ambition is reflected in the choice of analytical 
questions, empirical material and theoretical approaches, and it is inspired by Michael 
Barzelay’s book The New Public Management: Improving Research and Policy 
Dialogue (2001). The starting-point of the analysis is the “middle position” taken by 
certain researchers working in the field in-between management theory and public 
administration. These authors claim that “Does performance management suit the 
public sector?” is the wrong question, as there is no such thing as “the public sector”. 
They argue that differences between public agencies and their different natures of 
service delivery will profoundly influence if and how performance management 
works. (Hofstede 1981, Macintosh 1985, Wilson 1989, Carter et.al. 1992, Hyndman 
and Eden 2000 and Barzelay 2000b). 
 The overarching research question asked in this thesis is “can performance 
management facilitate the processes of organisational intelligence in governmental 
organisations?”. Based on the analysis of the Larvik experience, the conclusion is 
“Yes, but in quite various ways and to varying extents across the different areas of 
service delivery”. The two theoretical approaches applied, contingency theory and 
theory on organisational learning, make sense of these “variations”. 
In chapter 2 the key concepts are discussed, theories are outlined and 
hypothesises are put forward. Chapter 3 explains how the thesis is designed to 
intelligibly “test”  these hypothesises over the following chapters; chapter 4 presents 
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the empirical material from the Larvik experience and chapter 5 analyses the material 
in relation to the hypothesises. Chapter 6 addresses some of the practical and 
theoretical lessons that can be drawn from this experience. 
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2. Theoretical Framework and 
Hypothesising  
 
 
Sections 2.1 and 2.2 in this chapter define and discuss the concepts and issues that are 
central to this thesis: organisational intelligence, performance management and the 
balanced scorecard. My aim is to make clear that in attempting to resolve the practical 
and theoretical controversies over these issues, we need to apply the theories outlined 
in sections 2.3. and 2.4: contingency theory and theory on learning in organisations. In 
each of these two sections theory is used to put forward hypothesises about how and 
why the performance management/organisational intelligence-marriage will function 
differently in different areas of public sector service delivery. These hypothesises are 
made subject to empirical scrutiny in chapters 4 and 5. 
 
2.1 Public Management Doctrines and the Two Processes 
of Organisational Intelligence  
 
In short and general, I understand management in an organisation as an attempt to 
facilitate and enhance what March and Olsen (1976) call organisational intelligence. 
Like individual intelligence, organisational intelligence is built on two fundamental 
processes; rational calculation and learning from experience (March and Olsen 
1976:54). The first, rational calculation is linked to planning for the future, which 
again is linked to management science. The second process is learning from 
experience. I define organisational learning as what happens when an organisation 
makes a relatively permanent change in its behaviour on the basis of experience 
(Jacobsen and Thorsvik 1997:298) (see section 2.4 below for a lengthy outline of 
learning in organisations). 
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Too often, public management is simply equated with “management control”: i.e. it 
is related to the process of rational calculation only. According to Dunsire (1991), 
management control is whatever keeps the state of a system within some sub-set of all 
its possible states. In the abstract, Dunsire argues, management control is a product of 
the interaction of three components: 
• a director component (whatever is capable of setting standards over the 
preferred sub-set of all possible states of the system);  
• a detector component (whatever is capable of identifying or monitoring the 
states of a system); and  
• an effector component (whatever is capable of modifying behaviour or altering 
the state of a system) (Dunsire 1991). 
The result of the interplay of the director, detector and effector components is 
management control, defined as “the process by which managers assure that resources 
are obtained and used effectively and efficiently in the accomplishment of the 
organisation’s objectives” (Hofstede 1981:193). Management control systems, then, 
are the systematised means by which upper management in an organisation measure, 
monitor and motivate the managers of its various responsibility centres (Macintosh 
1985:241)1. 
Especially in German and related languages, the word “control” has what 
Christopher Hood calls “comptrol”-connotations. Comptrol denotes self-conscious 
oversight, from a point of authority, by defined individuals endowed with formal rights 
to enquire, call for changes in behaviour, and (sometimes) punish (Hood 1991, 1998). 
This simple equation of management with control is a dead-end for the theoretical 
field of public management The analytical limits of this “command and control”-
perception of management in complex organisations has been identified from 
perspectives as different as institutional economics and biology and cybernetics. 
Institutional economics focuses on principal-agent- and transaction-cost problems 
                                                          
1 In a private firm, responsibility centres might be accounting divisions, sales divisions and production divisions. In a 
governmental organisation, like a municipality, the responsibility centres are the functional departments responsible for the 
various tasks, like medical centres, schools, child care units and infrastructural departments. The “unit of analysis” of a 
management control system is the entire responsibility centre, as opposed to the various activities or parts within these 
centres. I.e., the manager in charge of the responsibility centre is the focal point of the management control system. 
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(Thompson 1993), and biology and cybernetics focus on “autopoiesis” and “the law of 
requisite variety” (Brans and Rossbach 1997, Dunsire 1991).  
The lesson I take from this is not that management control is irrelevant in public 
management. Rather, my assumption in the following is this: To fruitfully discuss a 
management doctrine2, its ability to facilitate both fundamental processes of 
organisational intelligence must be taken into account. Management control is one, 
organisational learning the other.  
 
2.2 The Performance Management Doctrine 
 
The term performance management is used in various ways within the field of public 
management. This diversity is due to the fact that public management is a field where 
authoritative contributions from management, accounting, economics, sociology, 
psychology and public administration meet, compete, and to some extent synerge.  
In this thesis I understand performance management as the administrative 
doctrine that says that in managing organisations, after-the-fact controls (ex post) 
mechanisms are preferable to before-the-fact (ex ante) mechanisms (Thompson, 1993: 
304). This doctrine answers the third of what Thompson calls the four key choices in 
designing management control systems for organisations: what, where, when and who 
to control (ibid.).  
 Thompson himself best explains the conceptual distinction between before- and 
after-the-fact control mechanisms:  
Before-the-fact controls are intended to prevent subjects from doing 
undesirable things or to compel them to do desirable things and necessarily 
take the form of authoritative mandates, rules, or regulations that specify what 
                                                          
2 My use of the term doctrine is the one established by Hood and Jackson (1991): A doctrine is a set of ideas, and it lies half-
way between “theory” and “policy”. “Theory” means an attempt to make observations consistent, and “policy” an attempt to 
make actions consistent. “A doctrine then, looks both ways; it makes plain, but in the manner if “revealed truth” rather than 
the tentative hypothesising of theory. It shows what must be done, but as if it were from necessity rather than the mere 
instrumentalism of policy” (Hood and Jackson 1991:16). In other words, doctrines offer authoritative answers to “what-to-
do” questions in public management, but without being able to prove their claims in a way that would satisfy a natural 
scientist or a professor of logic. Doctrines have a more argumentative character, in that they win acceptance through social 
processes, on the basis of “soft data”, “soft logic” and rhetoric. Examples of doctrines are “hire public servants on a tenure 
basis”, “Recruit public servants on the basis of merit” and “Use long lines of hierarchy” (Hood and Jackson 1991: 12ff, 33ff). 
Note that a  “doctrine” corresponds fairly well with what Røvik (1998) calls an organisational recipe[organisasjonsoppskrift]: 
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the subject must do, may do or must not do. The subjects of before-the-fact 
controls are held responsible for complying with these commands and the 
controller attempts to monitor and enforce compliance with them. 
After-the-fact controls are executed after the subject acts. (…) Because bad 
decisions cannot be undone after they are carried out, after-the-fact controls 
are intended to motivate subjects to make good decisions. Hence, subjects are 
made responsible for the consequences of their decisions, and the controller 
attempts to monitor those consequences and to see that subjects are rewarded 
or sanctioned accordingly. (Thompson 1993:304) 
 
It is worth noting that this definition of performance management takes a quite 
different approach than those found in so-called New Public Management (NPM)-
literature. There, performance management is often defined with an implicit or 
explicit reference to a distinction between forms of “organisational effectiveness” 
(Scott 1992). In the terms applied throughout this thesis (cf. p.12f), my 
interpretation is that many NPM-writers see performance management as a tool for 
enhancement of “outcome” organisational effectiveness only; not “structural” or 
“procedural” effectiveness (Hood 1995:95). As will be made clear, this thesis 
claims that such a definition is analytically unhelpful, since both a priori reasoning 
and the lessons from the present experience argue that performance management 
may very well be used for enhancement of all three forms of organisational 
effectiveness. 
 Authoritative contributions to the management literature agree that the 
following six chained points make up the central principles of performance 
management (informed by Horngren, Sundem and Stratton 1996): 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
a legitimised recipe for how to configure parts or elements of an organisation. It is a recipe that has achieved a  “model”-
9 
Performance Management and Organisational Intelligence 
Table 1: The principles of performance management  
1. Define a limited number of strategic goals for the organisation’s activity. 
2. Find the critical success factors, hierarchically sub-ordered the strategic goals. 
Critical success factors are things that must be in place or accomplished before 
the organisation can reach its goals. 
3. Delegate to the functional sub-units of the organisation to focus on the critical 
success factors within their respective areas. 
4. For each functional sub-unit, make a budget. I.e. specify what is considered 
satisfactory performance on the critical success factors. 
5. Demand from the sub-units reports on performance relative to budget. 
6. On the basis of the reports, decide whether corrective action is needed towards 
the sub-units or the organisation as a whole. 
 
Like all administrative doctrines, performance management has a history in public 
management. In his analysis of public sector developments in the OECD countries, 
Frieder Naschold (1996) depicts the history of performance management by starting 
off from Management by Objectives (MbO) in the 1970s. He then describes MbO’s 
transformation into Management by Results (MbR) in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
and ends the story in the late 1990s, with something I interpret to resemble the 
Balanced Scorecard (cf. below): decentralised contextual steering.  
Though we see these variations over performance management presented as 
distinct management concepts in the literature, and not least by management 
consultants, the differences between MbO, MbR and BSC are far from clear-cut. As 
often as not, the differences might be as much matters of implementation than of 
conceptual differences. This “confusion” is evident in one of the Norwegian 
Municipality Association’s “How to“- guides, where the balanced scorecard is equated 
with “balanced MbO” (KS 2000:48). Nonetheless, some differences deserve to be 
mentioned. In short, what unites all three embodiments of performance management is 
the management cycle described as points 1-6 in Table 1. What differentiates them is 
which parts of the doctrine they emphasise (Naschold 1996:65). MbO stresses the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
status for many organisations” (Røvik 1998:13). 
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setting of objectives (points 1-2) while MbR stresses the feeding back of results 
(points 4-5). What basically distinguishes the BSC from its two predecessors is its spin 
on goal-setting (point 2 in particular) and the weight placed on delegation and 
participation (related to points 3 and 6) (cf. p.18ff).  
Since the 1980s, efforts to introduce the principles of performance management, 
in one form or the other, have been made in many OECD countries, and especially 
throughout Scandinavia (Naschold 1996:65). Røvik (1998) describes how this 
happened in various governmental agencies and state-owned enterprises in the case of 
Norway. And moreover, as mentioned in the introduction, 71,2 percent of Norwegian 
municipalities reported to using performance management in some or all areas of 
activity in 2000. 24,7 percent claimed to use it in all areas. However, only 5,4 percent 
of the municipalities reported that they used performance indicators in all areas of 
activity. 37,4 percent used it in some areas (The Municipality Database, Ministry of 
Municipalities and Regional affairs). This supports the assumption that in practice 
there is confusion as to what one calls performance management. As will be made 
clear later, it makes little sense to use performance management without performance 
indicators.  
The management logic of performance management, as defined in Table 1, is 
used both inter-organisationally and intra-organisationally (terms from Christensen 
and Lægreid 1999). Inter-organisationally means that manager and managed are 
legally distinct bodies. Examples of inter-organisational performance management 
relations are (i) a municipality in relation to a private firm that performs municipal 
renovation services on contract, and (ii) the Ministry of Industry 
(Næringsdepartementet) in relation to Norwegian Rail (NSB) and state-owned (or –
controlled) enterprises like Statoil and Telenor. However, as indicated in the 
introduction, the preoccupation of this thesis is intra-organisational management; the 
use of performance management within an organisation, in the form of a management 
accounting system. Hence, until the concluding chapter, where I relate my findings to 
inter-organisational relationships as well, the reader should keep in mind that when the 
term performance management is used, we are always talking about management 
accounting systems.  
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2.2.1 The role of Performance indicators 
Any discussion of the performance management doctrine needs to feature the role 
played by performance measurement and performance indicators (PIs). The mother of 
all PIs was the Financial management initiative (FMI), Margaret Thatcher’s 1983 UK 
white paper. FMI emphasised that managers at all levels in government should have a 
“clear view of their objectives, and assess, and wherever possible measure, outputs or 
performance in relation to these objectives”. This principle made it essential to 
develop “performance indicators and output measures which can be used to assess 
success in achieving objectives” (Prime Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer 
1983, Carter et.al. 1991:86). 
 In the 1980s, many observers predicted PIs to be just another passing fashion, 
soon to be replaced by the next buzzword of management consultantcy. History has 
proven them wrong. By 1988, over 2000 PIs were in use across the UK core civil 
service (Carter et.al. 1991:86). Since then, any self-respecting OECD governmental 
reform initiative has highlighted the use of PIs. Related to the discussion in the 
previous section, PIs has been central to all embodiments of the performance 
management doctrine; MbO, MbR and the Balanced Scorecard. And PIs are used not 
only intra-organisationally; to an ever increasing extent PIs are used in the re-
regulation of former monopolies and network utilities like telecommunications and 
railways. 
 But what exactly are PIs? The answer depends on whom you ask, as e.g. what 
PIs measure and how are they used varies immensely from initiative to initiative, and 
from sector to sector. Hence, the purpose of this section is to give an account of this 
variety; an account that will prove itself useful for the empirical analysis over the 
chapters to follow. To provide a classification of kinds of PIs, I am interested in three 
features; how the PIs are measured, what they measure and how they are used.  
How are the PIs measured? Instrumental and Social tests 
Macintosh (1994:128-131) makes a distinction between several “scorekeeping 
situations”. The distinction most relevant for my purposes is the one between 
instrumental and social tests. An instrumental test is an authoritative objective 
12 
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assessment of the effectiveness of the organisation’s performance. Did the 
instrumental action taken achieve the desired state? Social tests, on the other hand, 
judge the performance of an organisation by the collective subjective opinions and 
beliefs of one or more stakeholders, like clients\customers, employees or overseers. An 
example from the Larvik experience of an instrumentally tested PI is “All employees 
shall complete a conflict-handling course”, [a “structural dial” according to the 
typology below] from the 2001 department plan of the Technical department. An 
example of a socially tested PI is “90 percent of all pupils shall feel comfortable at 
school”, ”, [a “structural tin opener” according to the typology below] from the 2001 
department plan of Byskogen school. 
What is measured? Outcome indicators and Procedural  and Structural Output 
indicators 
Informed by Scott’s discussion of how to measure organisational effectiveness, and 
Wilson’s distinction between outputs and outcomes (cf. page 25f), I make a distinction 
between measures of “outcome efficiency” (“outcome PIs”, hereafter), measures of 
“procedural output efficiency” (“procedural PIs”) and measures of “structural output 
efficiency” (“structural PIs”). 
Outcome PIs focus on specific characteristics of materials or objects on which 
the organisation in question has performed some operation. Examples of outcome 
indicators are: for educational organisations – (changes in) the knowledge or attitudes 
of students; for medical institutions - (changes in) the health status of patients; and for 
water provision agencies - (changes in) the quality of drinking water  (Scott 1992:353-
358, Wilson 1989:159).  
Procedural PIs, on the other hand, represent an assessment of input or energy - 
regardless of outcome. Some procedural indicators assess work quantity, like how 
many patients were seen in the emergency room of a hospital. Others assess work 
quality, like the number of complaints received. What they have in common is that 
they say something about efforts, - nothing about achievements or effects (Scott 1992).  
Structural PIs assess the capacity of the organisation to produce the desired 
outcome. Included here are all measures of organisational features presumed to have 
an impact on organisational effectiveness. Manufacturing organisations can be 
13 
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assessed by the value and age of their machinery; and almost any organisation, be it a 
school, a hospital or a management consultantcy firm, by the education, experience, 
age and good health of their employees. “If process measures are once removed from 
outcomes, then structure indicators are twice remote, for these indicators index not the 
work performed by structures, but their capacity to perform work” (Scott 1992:357). 
How are the PIs used? Dials and Tin-openers 
Carter and Carter et. al. (1991:94-95, 1992:49-51) make a distinction between 
prescriptive and descriptive indicators. A prescriptive PI operates like a dial, from 
which “performance” can be read off. Such a “dial” provides a precise measure of e.g. 
outcome-, procedural - or structural effectiveness, based on a pre-set norm or standard 
of what makes for good or bad performance. Examples of prescriptive PIs – “dials” – 
could be a measure of the amount of bacteria in water [outcome], or a pupil-per-
computer-ratio in a school [structural]. If there are too many pupils per computer, the 
school is under-performing, and something must me done. Likewise if there is too 
much bacteria in the water. Then the quality is simply not good enough. A dial is an 
unambiguous and un-challengable measure; it provides a means of “stopping up 
excuses” on the part of subordinates (Carter 1991: 93). 
A descriptive PI is more ambiguous, it works more like a “tin-opener opening 
up a can of worms” than as a dial (Carter 1991). By itself, a tin-opener provides only 
an incomplete and inaccurate picture. Such indicators do not give answers but prompt 
further interrogation and inquiry, or at least discussion. An example of a tin-opener PI 
could be a survey of client-satisfaction with the level of service they meet in a given 
public office. A reduction in the share of those “very satisfied” from 70% to 50% from 
one year to the next does not give any clear answers. It is simply an invitation for the 
responsible authorities to investigate this office, to probe and to ask questions. 
We see how this relates to Johansson’s discussion of the distinction between 
data and information (see p. 36 below). A datum represents something given, noted by 
someone. A datum is meaningful to the person who makes the note, but not necessarily 
to others. Others need to interpret the datum before it becomes meaningful; i.e. before 
it becomes a piece of information. In Johansson’s term, information is knowledge for 
the purpose of taking effective action (Johansson 1995:19). A dial, then, is a piece of 
14 
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data that requires little interpretation to become information for either the department 
manager or upper management in the organisation. A tin-opener is data that needs 
much interpretation to become “information”, in Johansson’s term.  
A Typology of Performance Indicators 
In sum, the questions of “what is measured” and “how used” form a 3*2 typology of 
PIs, as represented by Figure 1. For illustrative purposes, PIs in use in Larvik 
municipality during the 1996-2001-experience are fitted into each of the categories. 
For the sake of simplicity, the distinction between instrumental and social tests is 
omitted from the typology. The empirical analysis in chapter four will show, however, 
that social tests are usually used as tin-opener measures of either outcome or structural 
effectiveness.  
Figure 1: A typology of performance indicators, with examples 
 
What do the PIs measure?  
Outcome Procedural output Structural output 
Dials  
 
Ex: “85% of all 
drinking water shall 
be of satisfactory 
quality”  
(from the 2001 
department plan of 
the Technical 
department) 
 
Ex: “Comply with 
environmental 
standards in 60% of all 
projects”  
(from the 2001 
department plan of the 
Technical department) 
Ex: “Institutionalise 
meetings between the 
department and the 
municipality’s Social 
benefits department”  
(from the 2001 
department plan of the 
Work and Employment 
department) 
Use of 
indicat
ors 
Tin-
openers  
 
Ex: “A doubling of 
the number of sports 
organisations in the 
municipality that 
have included 
disabled in their 
activities” (from the 
2001 department plan 
of the Culture and 
sports department)  
Not used in Larvik. 
Hypothetical example: 
“Receive no 
complaints from 
consumers” 
Ex: “Percentage sick-
leave”  
(from the 2001 
department plan of the 
Work and employment 
department) 
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2.2.2 How Performance management facilitates Organisational 
intelligence 
As underlined above, my assumption is that in order to fruitfully discuss a 
management doctrine, its ability to facilitate both fundamental processes of 
organisational intelligence must be taken into account. Management control is one, 
organisational learning the other. The question addressed in this section is how the 
management accounting-embodiment of the performance management doctrine claims 
to facilitate these two processes. 
Management accounting and Management control 
First, in order to facilitate management control, management accounting systems 
prescribe deregulation of service provision activities and delegation of operational 
powers to functional sub-units in the organisation. Recall from p. 7 that management 
control systems are the systematised means by which upper management in an 
organisation measure, monitor and motivate the managers of its various responsibility 
centres (Macintosh 1985:241). 
The “deal” is that in exchange for a dedication to certain agreed objectives, the 
sub-units get freedom from top-down command&control. The idea is that if you “let 
the managers manage” they will do so effectively and efficiently. Øgård (2000:33,39) 
describes this phenomenon as “faith in management”.  
The director component of management control corresponds with the third and 
fourth steps in the performance management doctrine (see Table 1, p.10): “Delegate to 
the functional sub-units of the organisation to focus on the critical success factors 
within their respective areas” and “For each functional sub-unit, make a budget. I.e. 
specify what is considered satisfactory performance on the critical success factors”. 
Related to management accounting in a divisionalised organisation, this means that 
each department is to develop annual department plans, with PIs setting standards for 
the department’s performance that year. The respective roles and influence of upper 
management, department management or department staff in this process will vary. As 
will the level of detail in the department plans. 
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The detector component of management control corresponds to step five in 
Table 1: “Demand from the sub-units reports on performance relative to budget”. Such 
performance reports are to reveal to upper management possible deviations from the 
plan or budget. Reports may have different levels of detail and the frequency of 
reporting may wary from annual to daily.  
The effector component corresponds to step six in Table 1: “On the basis of the 
reports, decide whether corrective action is needed towards the sub-units or the 
organisation as a whole”. The form of corrective action may vary from giving 
department managers advice on how to better achieve their targets to promoting or 
firing department managers or staff.  
Note that there are two kinds of objectives, organisation-wide ones and 
objectives that are unique for the sub-unit in question. For the organisation-wide ones, 
a hierarchy of objectives can be established. In such a hierarchy a sub-unit’ objectives 
– in a modified, internalised form –  reflect the goals set at the top of the organisation. 
To Kaplan and Norton, enhancing such “strategy-focusedness” is the overarching 
rationale for implementing BSCs in the public sector. The BSC-slogan is in fact 
“Translating strategy into action”. As Kaplan and Norton observe:  
In our experience, [not-for-profit] and government agencies typically have 
considerable difficulty in defining clearly their strategy. We have seen “strategy” 
documents running upwards of fifty pages. These organisations must understand 
(…) that strategy is not only what the organisation intends to do, but also what it 
decides not to do. (Kaplan and Norton 2001:133).  
Management accounting and Organisational learning 
In order to enhance organisational learning, management accounting systems spark 
off a learning process that is to run continuously in the organisation (March and Olsen 
1976, Argyris and Shön 1975, Luckett and Eggleton 1991, Weick 2001). The 
relationship between the process of learning and the performance management 
doctrine is that this process takes place in each sub-unit, corresponding to points 4-6 in 
Table 1. Again and again, units at all levels of the organisation are to find out how 
they can achieve their objectives, both unit-specific and organisation-wide. The basis 
of learning is the cyclic process represented in Table 2.  
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Table 2: The process of organisational learning, as prescribed by management 
accounting systems 
1. Specify performance indicators, related to your objectives. 
2. Plan how to perform well on these PIs. 
3. Find out how you are doing on your PIs by getting and processing feedback from 
your environment (denoted scanning in section 2.4 below). 
4. Start from the top again (denoted response in section 2.4), based on an 
interpretation of the feedback, conducted by upper management and the unit 
manager in concert (denoted interpretation in section 2.4). 
 
With each “circle” – which corresponds to the frequency of performance reporting, 
discussed above- the department presumably gets better at all the four steps in the 
process: The department in question (1) sets better PIs; (2) gets better at planning how 
to perform well on the PIs; and (3) improves at getting and processing feedback 
(scanning); and (4) enhances its interpretation skills. 
Frieder Naschold (1996) has highlighted the importance of studying the process of 
learning in evaluations of performance management. In his treatment of OECD public 
sector reforms in the 1990s, one of Naschold’s observations is that while we are all 
aware of the necessity of management control; 
Successful reform projects point to a function of the new steering model which 
normally remains in the background: the (…)  importance of the interactive and 
decentralised negotiating process, [with] … continuous and targeted discussion 
and negotiation on targets, results and their conditions (…). In such a case, the 
new steering system is to be considered less as a [management control system] 
than as a suitable basis for collective and binding learning, experience and 
conciliation processes (Naschold 1996:9). 
The Balanced Scorecard 
Before moving on it is useful to make a distinction between “classic” and “modern” 
management accounting systems. A “classic” management accounting system is a tool 
for  management of financial aspects only. In its  “modern” form, the management 
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logic is the same (cf. Table 1), but aspects beyond the financial are incorporated into 
the system. The Balanced Scorecard (BSC) is the most high-profiled and discussed 
version of a “modern” management accounting system. The BSC was developed by 
Kaplan and Norton through a series of articles in Harvard Business Review in the early 
1990s, and through two books, The Balanced Scorecard (1996) and The Strategy-
Focused Organisation (2001).  
Kaplan and Norton built the BSC in response to a growing perception among 
practitioners and academics alike. The perception was that the focus on short-term 
economic measures made “traditional” management accounting systems no longer 
helpful in managing companies in the private sector and of very little relevance to 
public and not-for-profit organisations. Dr. Kaplan was himself one of the most 
outspoken critics of the traditional way, most notably in his book Relevance Lost, The 
Rise and Fall of Management Accounting (Johnson and Kaplan, 1991). The idea 
behind the BSC was to mend the deficiencies of the traditional management 
accounting systems, but without scrapping the management logic depicted in Table 1): 
The balanced scorecard retains traditional financial measures. But financial 
measures tell the story of past events, an adequate story for industrial age 
companies for which investments in long-term capabilities and customer 
relationships were not critical for success. These financial measures are 
inadequate, however, for guiding and evaluating the journey that information 
age companies must make to create future value through investment in 
customers, suppliers, employees, processes, technology, and innovation 
(Kaplan and Norton 1996)  
Hence, a BSC is a management accounting system that combines traditional, 
short-termed financial measures with short-, medium- and long-term operational, non-
financial measures. In its original form, as it was developed by Kaplan and Norton 
(Kaplan and Norton 1992:71ff), the balanced scorecard urges managers to identify and 
measure critical performance variables from four perspectives; a financial perspective; 
a customer perspective; an innovation and learning perspective; and from an internal 
business perspective.  
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According to Kaplan and Norton the BSC is “used extensively in both the 
private, public and not-for-profit sector across the world” (2001: vii). It is difficult, 
though, to assess how widely the BSC is actually implemented. No hard data are 
available to witness this, neither for the case of Scandinavia nor for other OECD 
countries. But there is evidently a strong interest in BSC, among practitioners and 
academics alike. The academic attention is reflected in the fact that Kaplan and 
Norton’s The Balanced Scorecard (1996) has been translated into nineteen languages 
(Kaplan and Norton 2001: vii) and that a vast number of academic articles has been 
published on the subject.  
Worth noting, however, are the several indications of a steeply rising interest in 
BSC among local and central governmental agencies across Scandinavia. In all three 
countries –Norway, Sweden and Denmark- books have been published, telling 
success-stories about respective national implementations in both the private, public 
and not-for-profit sector (Hoff and Holving 2001; Olve, Roy and Wetter 1997; Bukh, 
Fredrksen and Hegaard 2000, respectively). A further indication is the fact that all 
three national municipality associations have produced respective handbooks on “how 
to implement a Balanced Scorecard” (Kommunenes Sentralforbund 2000:47ff, Bukh, 
Fredriksen and Hegaard 2000:260). According to the Norwegian Municipality 
Association 20% of Norwegian municipalities have implemented a BSC – “… in part 
or totally” (KS 2000:48). I believe this number to be widely exaggerated, however, 
and it might be a result of the above-mentioned semantic confusion of BSC, MbO and 
MbR. What is for sure, is that the Norwegian Ministry of Local Government and 
Regional Development has set up a pilot project to help municipalities implement 
BSCs, and per December 2001, a number Norwegian municipalities have implemented 
or are starting the implementation3.  
2.2.3 Two poles and a middle position in the controversy over 
performance management 
Common to all embodiments of the performance management doctrine is that their 
applicability to governmental organisations is subject to much debate. Unfortunately, 
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as mentioned in the introduction, both critics and supporters often make very broad 
claims, too often based more on rhetoric than strong and relevant empirical support. A 
brief introduction to this controversy is a prerequisite for understanding the relevance 
of the two bodies of theory outlined over sections 2.3 and 2.4. 
Central among the unconditioned optimists are Osborne and Gaebler. Their 
book Reinventing Government (1992) is a best-selling American tract for “New Public 
Management”, and a key source of inspiration for the 1993 US National Performance 
Review (Barzelay and Thompson, forthcoming). In the introductory chapter, called 
“An American Perestroika”, the authors describe the “bankruptcy” of the  public 
management policy they call “the bureaucratic model”. The bureaucratic model is 
described as a “command and control”-model, based on hierarchical authority, 
functional specialisation and a focus on recruitment, merit, professionalism and rules 
and procedures (Osborne and Gaebler 1992: 12-16). They use what Hood (1994) calls 
a “habitat change” argumentation, by claiming that the bureaucratic model has 
“worked superbly”, but today it is outdated. The model was developed in conditions 
very different from those we experience now. Today, “most government institutions 
perform increasingly complex tasks, in competitive, rapidly changing environments, 
with customers who want quality and choice” (ibid.:12,16).  
Based on “a journey through the [US] landscape of governmental change .. over 
the past five years”, the authors conclude that governments who have realised which 
public management policies are suited for the modern era “measure the performance of 
their agencies, focusing not on inputs but on outcomes. They are driven by their goals 
–their missions- not by their rules and regulations… They decentralize authority, 
embracing participatory management” (ibid.:19-20). 
No less dogmatic are the unconditioned pessimists. Many political scientists 
criticise performance management and doubt its applicability to public organisations 
on the basis of its implicit or explicit reliance on agency theory. These criticisms are 
often very theoretical in form and escape the scope of this thesis. What unites most 
unconditioned pessimists is an almost platonic idea of “publicness”, reflected in a 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
3 Tønsberg, Larvik, Drammen, Sør-Trøndelag fylkeskommune, Stavanger, Sandnes, Bærum 
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strong scepticism of performance management’s sensitivity to the realities and values 
distinctive to the public sector.  
The pessimists argue that performance management’s reliance on the 
techniques of accounting leads to a strong emphasis on quantification, measurement, 
operational efficiency and numerical accountability. They claim that the performance 
management doctrine in effect is relevant only to organisations whose main purpose is 
to produce profit; a clear, unambiguous, observable and measurable outcome; known 
as the currency of all things in the world of business. As a result, they make the broad-
brush conclusion that performance management is applicable to the for-profit-sector 
only, not to organisations in the not-for-profit sector. 
What the pessimists fear, if performance management is applied to 
governmental organisations, is a management policy geared more to short-term 
production of outputs than planning for the long haul, and systems more attuned to 
accounting for what has been produced than to evaluate progress in achieving major 
policy objectives (Schick 1996:53, Lapsey 2000:170-171, Eriksen 2001, McSweeney 
1994, Rombach 1991 and 1992, and Naschold 1996) 
A middle position in the controversy is taken by those who argue that there is 
no such thing as “the public sector”. In their analysis of British experiences with 
performance management Carter, Klein and Day (1992) conclude that “The commonly 
held belief that performance assessment differs between public and private 
organisations because the latter possess the bottom line, profit, does not stand up to 
examination” (ibid.:51).  
Addressing the “unconditioned pessimists”, they argue that the issues of 
management system design and system use is best framed in terms of organisational 
characteristics that transcend the conventional for-profit/not-for-profit divide (ibid.) 
“One conclusion, above all, stands out from both the history of managerial reforms 
(…) and the review of the main concepts and issues in the performance literature. This 
is that the notion of performance (…) is, in theory and practice, both contestable and 
complex. It seems apparent that differences between organisations and the nature of 
service delivery will profoundly influence the design and use of performance 
indicators (ibid.: 50-51). 
22 
Performance Management and Organisational Intelligence 
Authors such as Hofstede (1981), Hyndman and Eden (2000) and Barzelay 
(2000b) reinforce this argument. In short, what unites these middle-positionists, is that 
they argue that differences between public sector-agencies and their different natures 
of service delivery will profoundly influence if and how performance management 
works. 
Building on the middle position 
In an attempt to make sense of these “differences” within the public sector – 
hypothesised to influence if and how performance management works – two bodies of 
theory will be introduced over the next two sections. These are contingency theory in 
section 2.3, and theory on learning in organisations in 2.4.  
Why use these two approaches? Recall that on pages 7-8 I argued that to 
intelligibly discuss any management doctrine, it’s attempts to facilitate both 
fundamental processes of organisational intelligence must be taken into account; 
management control and organisational learning. This is the justification for moving 
the thesis on as follows: In section 2.3, the contingency approach is put to work to 
make sense of how management control varies across organisations; and in section 2.4, 
theory on learning in organisations is used to understand how organisational learning 
varies. Each of the sections conclude with respective hypothesises about what patterns 
of practice we might expect to find in various types of organisations. These 
hypothesises will in turn be measured up to the experiences of the departments in 
Larvik municipality, narrated in chapter 4. 
 
2.3 Contingency Theory 
 
First in this section the background and general content of the contingency theory is 
introduced. Then I show how this approach relates to the balanced scorecard, and how 
it can be used to make hypothesises about how management control will vary across 
organisations. 
Over the years, public management theory has produced a range of theories on 
how organisations become successful and why certain organisations become more 
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successful than others. After the breakthrough of industrialism, the dominant schools 
of thought were scientific management (taylorism), the administrative school (Fayol), 
the bureaucratic school (weberianism) and human relations. Their substantial 
differences aside, what unites these schools of thoughts was their universalistic nature. 
Only to a very limited degree did their propositions for how to structure and manage 
organisations take into account the fact that organisations function under different 
internal and external circumstances (Johansson 1995:27).  
Burns and Stalker (1961) were among the first to break off from the 
universalistic strain by arguing that organisational success is contingent on situational 
factors in the internal and external environment, so-called contingency factors. Their 
focus was on whether environments and technologies (the nature of the work done) of 
organisations were stable or unstable. As a result they differentiated “mechanical” 
from “organic” organisations, and argued that central issues like structure, decision-
making, streams of information and criteria for effectiveness should be framed 
differently in the two organisational types respectively (Burns and Stalker 1961). 
Since then, contributions focusing on different contingency factors have made 
an impact in the field of public management theory. Factors that are often discussed 
are age, size and culture of the organisation. Note that authors using the contingency 
approach do not take the extreme position opposite to universalism, which would be a 
pure situation-specific position. Contingency theorists take a middle position, by 
indeed making generalisations about what is the “most effective” management style or 
organisational structure, but for classes of organisational operating conditions only. 
Over the next few pages, an approach based on the contingency factor 
organisational technology is used to make prediction about how management control 
practice will vary across different public sector organisations. 
2.3.1 Contingency Theory and Management Control 
The contingency approach applied in the following is based on the political scientist 
James Q. Wilson’s typology of organisational operating conditions, or organisational 
technologies (Wilson 1989). Subsequent to outlining his line of argument, I use 
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Wilson’s typology to make predictions about what kinds of management control 
practices we might expect to find in different types of organisations. 
Organisational technology pertains to the nature of work activities. It is “the 
actions an individual performs on an object, with or without the aid of tool or 
mechanical devices, in order to make some change in that object” (Perrow 1970:198). 
This definition stresses the organisation’s conversion process, which changes inputs to 
outcomes. Inputs may be any sort of raw material – people, ideas, orders, paperwork, 
steel castings- upon which organisational skill and knowledge is brought to bear 
(Macintosh 1994:112). 
Wilson’s point of departure for constructing his typology is the following 
statement:  
From a managerial point of view, agencies differ in two main respects: Can the 
activities of their operators be observed? Can the results of those activities be 
observed? The first factor involves outputs –what the teachers, doctors, 
engineers, police officers and grant-givers do on a day-to-day basis. (…) The 
second factor involves outcomes –how, if at all, the world changes because of the 
outputs. The outputs (or work) of police officers are the radio calls answered, 
beats walked, tickets written, accidents investigated, and arrests made. The 
outcomes (or results) are the changes, if any, in the level of safety, security, 
order, and amenity in the community  (Wilson 1989:158-9) 
Outputs of an agency may be hard to observe - for one or both of two reasons: 
Either what the operator does is esoteric (like an AD in an advertising firm, sitting in 
his chair and somehow coming up with a brilliant idea of how to sell a product) or 
because the operator acts out of view of the manager (like a forest ranger, looking after 
his forest, thousands of kilometres from his superiors) (ibid.:159). Related to the cases 
we will get to know in the analysis in chapters 4-5, the output of a teacher at Byskogen 
School is unobservable for both reasons. His or her output is esoteric because no 
manager can predict exactly how a teacher can succeed in explaining algebra to a 
specific pupil; and a teacher behind the closed classroom door is well out of view of 
superiors.  
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Similarly, the outcomes of an agency may be hard to observe - for one or both 
of the following two reasons: Either because the outcome appears after a long delay 
(for example, the meaningful time to measure whether a drug rehabilitation 
programme makes an addict drug-free is not the month after rehab), or - because the 
outcome results from an unknown combination of operator behaviour and other factors 
(for example, a pupil’s exam results reflect some mixture of pupil intelligence, 
parental influence and teacher skill) (ibid.). 
Observing outputs and outcomes is not either possible or impossible; in real-life 
it is rather either easy or difficult. Nonetheless, for analytical purposes it is useful to 
put the two dimensions together to produce a typology of four ideal cases of 
organisational technologies, as illustrated in Figure 2.  
 
OUTCOMES  
Observable Not observable 
Ob-
servable 
 
PRODUCTION 
TECHNOLOGY 
 
PROCEDURAL 
TECHNOLOGY 
 
 
 
OUTPUTS 
Not ob-
servable 
CRAFT 
TECHNOLOGY 
 
COPING  
TECHNOLOGY 
 
 
Figure 2: A typology of organisational technologies  
 
Over a number of articles and books, Norman B. Macintosh has extended a 
contingency approach very similar to Wilson’s to statements about what sort of 
management control practices are suitable to the different types of organisational 
technology. These recommendations are based in part on theoretical deduction and in 
part on induction from empirical research into the management control practices of 
ninety responsibility centres in twenty large private and public organisations 
(Macintosh 1985:247). Accordingly, over the following paragraphs I put forward 
hypothesises about the relationship between organisational technology and 
management control practice. 
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In other words, the question addressed by the hypothesises 1A-1C is this: 
“What management control practices do we expect to observe developing over time in 
the relation between upper management and departments characterised by different 
forms of organisational technologies?” The implications of the different types of 
practices hypothesised will be outlined in terms of their respective operationalisations 
on the three components of management control: We recall from page 7 that 
management control is often understood as a product of the interaction of three 
components: a director component (whatever is capable of setting standards over the 
preferred sub-set of all possible states of the system); a detector component (whatever 
is capable of identifying or monitoring the states of a system); and an effector 
component (whatever is capable of modifying behaviour or altering the state of a 
system).  
Chapter 4 narrates and compares the parallel change experiences of four very 
different functional departments within the context of Larvik municipality; 
departments that cover almost the whole range of organisational technologies, as 
framed by Wilson. Over a period of six years, these departments all implemented a 
balanced scorecard, through a process characterised by what I have denoted  
improvisation (cf. p. 54). This empirical material arguably provides a prime site for 
testing Macintosh’s conclusions, as the underlying idea of his take is evolutionary:  In 
general, Macintosh argues, organisations seek organisational structures that are 
congruent with their technologies. It follows that they would also seek a congruence 
between these factors and their management control systems. (Macintosh 1985:246-
255, 1994:112-113). 
Hypothesis 1: The BSC-reform has facilitated management control in Larvik.  
The nil-hypothesis is that management control was not facilitated.  
 
Hypothesis 1 is my point of departure for constructing the more specific hypothesises 
about the BSC-reform and management control in Larvik: Hypothesises 1A-1C 
(below). Informed by Macintosh’s framework, my assumption is that what Hypothesis 
1 entails in terms of actual management control practices in the relationship between 
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the departments and upper management is contingent upon the four departments’ 
respective organisational technologies:   
Hypothesis 1A: Production technology and close management control  
An agency whose outputs and outcomes are both observable, has a production 
technology. Such agencies are – (due to NPM) to an ever increasing extent - further 
between in the public sector than in the private. Some can be found, though. Wilson 
uses the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) as an example. Outputs are the activities of 
clerks and auditors; outcomes are the amount of money collected in taxes as a result of 
their efforts; both easily observed. Agencies providing infrastructural services, like 
road-building and water provision, are other examples.  
Hence, of the cases discussed in chapter 4, the Technical department is the 
one which closest resembles this ideal type. The Technical department is responsible 
for maintenance of public roads and parking spaces, including traffic safety and traffic 
lights; building, running and maintaining the public water transportation and sewage 
systems; renovation and recycling of domestic waste; running and maintaining public 
parks and toilets, sports facilities and playgrounds; and developing public residential- 
and industrial areas.  
Other departments in Larvik that can be argued to have a production-type 
organisational technology are the Electricity department and the Service Centre. The 
latter is responsible for processing letters and calls, arranging appointments, providing 
the public with various forms, etc. These cases are however not discussed in this 
thesis. 
Related to management control practice, my Macintosh-informed hypothesis 
is that in the Technical department, an organisation characterised by production 
technology, we will observe a “close” control practice developing over time. 
According to Macintosh (1985), the implications of this “close” practice are as 
follows. On the director component, upper municipal management will have a great 
influence in setting PIs, and PIs are many and detailed, focusing on outputs as well as 
outcomes. As for detector, performance reports are detailed and frequent. The need for 
steady, reliable and orderly outputs accounts in part for the high influence of upper 
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management in target setting, as well as for the frequent and detailed reporting 
(Macintosh 1985:248-9).  
What use can upper management in the municipality have of such a system?  
This management control practice resembles what Simon el. al. (1954) denote a 
“scorecarding” system; a system for close measuring and monitoring of output as well 
as outcome.  
Hypothesis 1B: Coping technology and prospects-oriented management control 
The opposite case is an agency whose outputs and outcomes are both unobservable; 
agencies characterised by coping technology. Of the cases discussed in chapter 4, 
Byskogen School is the department which closest resembles this ideal type. Why the 
outputs of such an organisation are unobservable was outlined above (cf. p.25). The 
outcomes of a school are also unobservable. First, because the outcome results from an 
unknown combination of the teacher’s or the school’s behaviour and other factors (for 
example, a pupil’s exam results reflect some mixture of pupil intelligence, parental 
influence and teacher skill). Alternatively, if one takes the view that the outcome of 
schooling is something like “wise, tolerant and well-adjusted citizens” rather than 
numeric exam results, the outcome obviously appears after a long delay.  
Related to management control practice, my Macintosh-informed hypothesis 
is that in Byskogen school, an organisation characterised by coping technology, we 
will observe a “prospects-oriented” control practice developing over time. According 
to Macintosh (1985:253), the implications of this practice are as follows: On the 
director component, employees and department managers are influential in setting 
targets, since they are more knowledgeable about the requirements of work, which is 
typically esoteric. Targets will not be detailed, but often “stretchers”; targets set at 
high levels, and i.e. hard to achieve. On the detector component, we will find 
infrequent and general reporting, since greater detail would be of little help to upper 
management.  
Consequently, this is not a system upper management in the municipality can 
use for “scorecarding”. Rather, it makes for a “softer” use, along the lines of 
evaluation, planning and estimation of future prospects, as well as co-ordination of the 
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department’s efforts with those of other departments (Simon et. al. 1954, Johansson 
1995:38). 
 
Procedural technology and procedural management control 
In agencies characterised by procedural technology, outputs are observable but 
outcomes are not. According to Wilson, the most archtypical example is the armed 
forces during peacetime. Every detail of output - training, equipment and deployment- 
performed in the army’s departments is under the direct inspection of upper 
management. But none of these factors can be tested in the only way that counts, 
against a real enemy, except in wartime (Wilson 1989:163).  
Though examples of such agencies can indeed be found in municipalities, none 
are analysed empirically in this thesis. Hence, no hypothesis will be put forward here 
about management control practice in “procedural” organisations. Suffice to note, 
then, that the hypothesis would have been that we would have observed a “procedural” 
control practice developing over time. 
This is not a control practice suitable for performance management. Breaking 
the practice down to entailments on director, detector and effector is hence 
meaningless. “Procedural” control is typically hierarchical lines of authority, formal 
rules and standard operating procedures; something that resembles the classic 
bureaucratic public management; in fact the opposite of the performance management 
doctrine, as defined in this thesis.    
Hypothesis 1C: Craft technology and results-oriented management control 
In the case of craft agencies, outcomes are observable but outputs are not. Arch-typical 
examples are advertising agencies, artists and football teams. The outcomes of such 
organisations are unambiguous and readily observable from an upper manager’s point 
of view: gross billings to clients, nice paintings, and good football, respectively4. 
Outputs, on the other hand, are largely esoteric, and hence unobservable. I.e., what 
                                                          
4 To be fair, the distinction between output and outcome will often be less straightforward than outlined here. An example 
from the world of football may illustrate this. In 2001, Hector Cuper was surprisingly fired as manager of the Spanish team 
Valencia. Mr. Cuper had lead his team to the top of the Spanish league and to the top of European football. His problem was 
hence not a lack of victories; it was the way he won. The fans thought Mr. Cuper’s team played boring football. 
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upper management can decide in advance, is the desired level of outcome; not how to 
get there (the output). Returning to football, Manchester United’s executive director 
will never be able to instruct the team manager, Sir Alex Ferguson, about his output, 
which is how to give the players the morale, spirit and confidence they need to 
perform to the best of their abilities. But he is nonetheless in his full right to fire him 
on the basis of poor outcome; i.e. if the team does not do well.  
Among the cases discussed in chapter 4, the Culture and sports department and 
the Work and employment department closest resemble this ideal type, though the 
latter is perhaps the best fit. The outcome of the Work and employment department 
is to “provide work or other occupation to people whose work-capacity or competence 
is unresolved and to people who for some other reason have not made a choice of 
occupation ”. Typical clients are immigrants without the necessary language skills, 
physically challenged and mentally ill people (Department plan 2001:2, interview with 
Mr. Auby, the department manager). In short, the outcome of the department’s 
activities is to get people off benefits and into paid occupation. Whether or not this 
happens is arguably fairly easy to observe. 
The output of the Work and employment department is however not easily 
observed. Much of the work done consists of face-to-face interaction between 
professional councillors and clients, aiming to increase their self esteem and bring 
them out of passivity . “We must often try to find out how to give them the push that 
can bring them out of passivity; a setting they may have found to be comfortable”, Mr. 
Auby says (interview). Exactly how a front-line councillor manages to empower and 
motivate a specific client is hard to say – and i.e. hard to observe. 
The outcome of the work of the Culture and sports department is cultural 
activities like music, dance, theatre, literature, arts and sports and other outdoor 
activities. The department targets both the public at large and prioritised groups like 
children, elderly, immigrants, physically disabled and mentally challenged. The 
department is responsible for arranging and facilitating. To some extent the department 
is directly responsible as arranger of activities, but largely the department has a more 
intermediate role. The department advises, guides and economically supports the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Consequently, the board of directors fired him. The point is that Mr. Cuper and the fans disagreed over what was the 
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relevant cultural- and sports-organisations from the voluntary sector in the 
municipality. In addition the department invites external actors like the national theatre 
(“Riksteateret”) to perform in Larvik. The point is that whether or not popular cultural 
and sports activities take place in Larvik is fairly easily observed. 
The output of the Culture and sports department is harder to observe, especially 
in the areas where the departments have a more intermediate role. In these areas, the 
work performed is “unobservable”; it is activities like network-building within and 
outside the municipality, and inspiring and empowering local organisations. 
Related to management control practice, my Macintosh-informed hypothesis 
is that in the cases of the Work and Employment department and the Culture and 
Sports department, we will observe a “results-oriented” management control practice 
developing over time. According to Macintosh (1985), the implications of this practice 
are as follows. On the director component, targets are simple, involving instrumental 
tests which focus on outcomes, as close monitoring of output will not ensure efficiency 
or effectiveness5. Department managers have great influence in setting targets. Target 
levels are relatively easy to achieve. As for detector, control reports are frequent, and 
general in content, rather than detailed (Macintosh 1985:252-253). 
What use can upper management in the municipality have of such a system?  
Obviously, this is not a system for “scorecarding”. Macintosh argues that this is a 
system useful in clarifying target levels and thereby helping people to do things 
correctly (Macintosh 1985:253). This resembles what Simon et. al. (1954) call 
“attention-directing”. If the data reveals that e.g. the Culture and Sports department 
does not achieve the desired level of outcome, they know they need to make efforts to 
find out what they can do differently next time around. The system i.e. helps the 
department direct their attention towards certain aspects of their activities (Johansson 
1995:38). 
Hypothesis 2:  The BSC-reform has facilitated strategic management in Larvik  
Recall from page 17 that in a decentralised organisation there are two kinds of 
objectives, organisation-wide ones and objectives unique for the sub-unit in question. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
outcome. To Mr. Cuper, only victories was outcome; to the fans, style was as well. 
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For the organisation-wide ones, a hierarchy of objectives can be established. In such a 
hierarchy the objectives a sub-unit reflect – in a modified, internalised form – the goals 
set at the top of the organisation. When such a hierarchy is in place, strategy has been 
“translated into action” (Kaplan and Norton 2001). Related to Table 1, “The principles 
of performance management”, on page 10, this specific form of management control 
pertains to point three; “Delegate to the functional sub-units of the organisation to 
focus on the critical success factors within their respective areas”. 
 My hypothesis is that the BSC-reform has in fact facilitated strategic 
management in Larvik. Over the period studied, 1996-2001, I expect to find a 
hierarchy of objectives emerging in relation to all the four departments studied; the 
Technical department, the Work and employment department, the Culture and sports 
department and Byskogen school. 
 
2.4 Learning in Organisations 
 
First in this section theory on learning in organisations is introduced in general terms. 
Then I use this approach to make hypothesises about how the ways in which the BSC-
approach facilitates learning will vary across organisations. 
I define organisational learning as what happens when an organisation makes a 
relatively permanent change in its behaviour on the basis of experience (Robbins 
1993:110, Jacobsen and Thorsvik 1997:298). This definition may seem 
straightforward enough, but it is based on four terms and assumptions that need some 
elaboration (Jacobsen and Thorsvik 1997:298): 
1. A change in behaviour is something you can observe. If an organisation “knows” 
what to do (e.g. we have to respond to calls earlier to make our clients happy), but 
has yet to do so, it has not “learned”, according to this definition. 
2. The change in behaviour must be relatively permanent. An organisation has not 
learned if a change in behaviour is due to passing coincidences. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
5 For example, measuring outputs like the time spent by his office desk or the frequency of meetings attendance is no good 
indicator of whether an advertising agency AD does a good job or not. What counts is clients’ sales. 
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3. Learning is based on experience; either the organisation’s direct experiences, or 
indirect experiences, obtained from reading or hearing about others’ experiences. 
4. Finally, learning contains elements of both knowledge and an action. Learning 
happens when an organisation experiences something (clients are unhappy), tries to 
analyse why this is so (too slow responses to calls), tries to find out what to do to 
achieve a better result (respond more quickly) and finally changes behaviour (starts 
responding more quickly to calls).  
 
 
 [a] Individual 
beliefs and 
preferences 
[b] Individual 
action  
[c] Organisational 
action [d] Environmental  
response. 
”Feedback” 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3:  The complete cycle of organisational learning 
 
Figure 3 is March and Olsen’s illustration of “the complete cycle” of organisational 
learning. They use the cycle not to illustrate that organisational learning is easy, 
however. March and Olsen argue that learning is difficult, as in many cases one or 
more of the arrows are interrupted (March and Olsen 1976:54ff). The arrow central to 
this thesis in the one connecting boxes [d] and [a]. March and Olsen argue that in 
situations of ambiguity, we can not trust the assumption that e.g. negative feedback 
from the environment leads to changes in the beliefs and preferences of the individuals 
working in the organisation in question. In ambiguous situations the feedback is 
unclear. In the simple situation, the individual keen to learn sees that he affects 
organisational action, which in turn affects the environment. Under ambiguity, by 
contrast, subsequent events are seen only dimly, and causal connections among events 
have to be inferred. I.e. it is not clear what happened or why it happened (March and 
Olsen 1976:58). 
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This relates to point 4 above, in my definition of organisational learning. The 
road from experience (feedback) to changed behaviour is a long and winding one, as it 
must go via trying to analyse the feedback, finding out how it relates to prior conduct, 
and finding out what to do to get a better result (better feedback). Karl E. Weick 
(2001) highlights the importance of interpretation in his framing of organisations as 
learning systems (see below).  
Organisations must make interpretations. Managers literally must wade into the 
ocean of events that surround the organisation and actively try to make sense of 
them. Organisation participants physically act on these events, attending to some 
of them, ignoring most of them, and talking to other people to see what they are 
doing. Interpretation is the process of translating these events, of developing 
models for understanding, of bringing out meaning, and of assembling 
conceptual schemes. (Weick 2001:244) 
 As illustrated by Figure 4, Weick organises the process of organisational 
learning into three stages. Related to March and Olsen’s cycle, Weick’s scanning 
represents the organisation’s efforts to build the arrow between boxes [c] and [d]; 
interpretation represents the arrow between boxes [d] and [a], and response the arrows 
connecting [a]-[b] and [b]-[c]. 
 
 
SCANNING 
(Data collection) 
INTERPRETATION 
(Data given meaning;  data 
becomes information) 
RESPONSE 
(Action taken) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4:  Relationships among the components of organisational learning: 
Scanning, interpretation, and learning 
 (From Weick 2001:244) 
  
35 
Performance Management and Organisational Intelligence 
Scanning is the process of monitoring the environment and providing 
environmental data [feedback] to (the managers of) organisations. I will get back to the 
different means and strategies available for scanning later.  
Interpretation is about giving meaning to the data. Formally, Weick defines 
interpretation as the process of translating events and developing shared understanding 
and conceptual schemes among members of the organisation, or its leaders. The 
importance of interpretation to management accounting is highlighted by several 
authors. Luckett and Eggleton (1991) argue that while rightly acknowledging the 
importance of feedback [scanning], management accounting theory pays too little 
attention to the behavioural consequences of feedback. In other words, these authors 
complain that only scanning, the first of the three components of the learning process, 
is taken into account. Luckett and Eggleton argue that much due to an exaggerated 
dedication to the cybernetic mode of thinking about control,  
[t]he operation of the feedback loop is usually viewed in a neutral or mechanistic 
way in the management accounting literature. (…) There has been little critical 
appreciation or systematic analysis of the ways in which [feedback] may affect 
the behaviour of organisational participants. (Luckett and Eggleton 1991:372-3). 
 The importance of understanding interpretation is further underlined by 
Johansson (1995) who analytically separates data and information. A datum represents 
something given, noted by someone. A datum is meaningful to the person who makes 
the note, but not necessarily to others. Others need to interpret the datum before it 
becomes meaningful; i.e. before it becomes a piece of information. In Johansson’s 
term, information is knowledge for the purpose of taking effective action (Johansson 
1995:19).  
The difference between data and information can be illustrated by a couple of 
hypothetical examples. First, envision a manager of a water provision agency. He will 
probably have little difficulty of interpreting –and i.e. acting on- the following data: 
the content of sewage bacteria in the drinking water was above the critical limit last 
week. Far less straightforward is the interpretation task in example two: A user-survey 
tells the manager of a child care agency that 80% of its clients are unhappy with the 
quality of services. The point is this: To become information for individuals in an 
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organisation, data need interpretation – which, however, can be straightforward or very 
difficult. 
For too long, Johansson argues, management accountants overlooked the 
difference between data and information. Over time, Mintzberg (1975), Macintosh 
(1985) and other organisation theorists have managed to make an impact in the field of 
management accounting. Now there is a growing perception that as only information 
can affect the behaviour of the individual in the organisation, it is vital –not least for 
management system designers- to understand how data in accounting reports is 
transformed into information for the individual (Johansson 1995:203). 
Response, the third stage of learning, is distinguished from interpretation by the 
concept of action. Response involves a (new) response or action based on 
interpretation (Argyris and Schön 1978, Weick 2001:244). 
We now turn to the task of understanding how the ways in which the BSC can 
facilitate organisational learning will vary across organisations. 
 
2.4.1 Understanding How Learning Varies Across Organisations 
To make sense of how the learning-process of scanning, interpretation and response 
happens and varies across organisations, we need some analytical tool. The one used 
in the following is provided by Weick, who puts together two theoretical dimensions 
to construct four learning modes, according to which real-life organisations can be 
categorised. Actual learning, framed as scanning-, interpretation- and response 
behaviour, is hypothesised to vary systematically according to which learning mode 
the organisation in question is in. The first dimension Wieck uses is denoted the extent 
to which the organisation intrudes into the environment to understand it; the second 
the organisation’s assumptions about the analysability of its environment. (Weick 
2001:245ff)6.  
                                                          
6 Note that what counts as an organisation’s “environment” is far from obvious. A full discussion of this question 
far escapes the scope of this thesis. Hence, in the following, for shorthand, I denote the following as an 
organisation’s “environment”: Stakeholders like clients/customers, employees and (political or administrative) 
overseers, and peers. What strengths and powers these groups possess in relation to the organisation in question, 
clearly varies immensely between areas of service activity in the public sector. 
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In short, my hypothesis is that the BSC-approach will force or help all types of 
organisations from a passive to an active intrusiveness mode. But what this transition 
entails in terms of changes in actual scanning-, interpretation- and response behaviour 
differs depending on whether the organisations in question assume that their 
environments are analysable or unanalysable.  
Following the next three sections, in which the learning modes-framework is 
outlined, this hypothesis is elaborated as hypothesises 3A and 3B.  
Organisational Intrusiveness 
Intrusiveness is about scanning and interpretation behaviour. Organisations in an 
active intrusiveness mode actively search their environment for “answers”. They 
strategically focus on it, and allocate considerable financial and human resources to 
continuous and systematic scanning activities. These active, or intrusive, organisations 
e.g. conduct surveys of satisfaction among their stakeholders, like clients and 
employees. Moreover, active organisations generally think creatively about how they 
can get feedback from different parts of their environment, and engage actively in how 
to interpret whatever feedback they get. Organisational intrusiveness -  
- may also include testing or manipulating the environment. These organisations 
may leap before they look, perform trials in order to learn what an error is, and 
discover what is feasible by testing presumed constraints. Forceful organisations 
may break presumed rules, or try to manipulate critical factors in the 
environment. (…) These organisations may be called test makers (Weick 
2001:246).  
Passive organisations, on the other hand, are informal and unsystematic in their 
scanning and interpretation activities. They interpret the environment within accepted 
limits. They accept whatever information the environment gives them, and thereby 
become what Weick calls test avoiders (ibid.:246-7).  
In order to explain why some organisations are in a passive, and others in an 
active intrusiveness mode, two explanatory components can be used; one “static”, the 
other “dynamic”. The static component is variation in dependency upon the 
environment (ibid.:247). A heavily dependent organisation needs to intrude actively 
into its environment. An example of a “dependent” organisation is one exposed to 
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competition. Imagine a public agency providing food to the elderly homes in a 
municipality on a contract-basis. It may be exposed to competition for next year’s 
contract from public agencies in neighbouring municipalities or from private 
companies. As it is dependent on customer satisfaction for continued contract, we 
would expect such an agency to be in a more active intrusiveness mode than a 
comparable agency that is not exposed to competition.  
The dynamic component in explaining why some organisations are “active” and 
others “passive”, is to what extent the managers are willing and able to keep the 
organisation in an active mode. Intrusiveness into the environment requires persistent 
interest and dedication to prioritise these activities, even in times of constrained 
resources. To achieve this a manager needs to build and nurture a culture of 
“dependency” among key employees.  
Assumptions About the Environment 
Organisations who perceive their environments as analysable believe that “there is an 
answer is out there” to the question “how shall we best go about doing our job?”. As a 
result, for such organisations, successful performance is simply a matter of scanning 
the environment for the relevant feedback, and subject it to the “correct” interpretation. 
The key to successful performance is hence “discovery through intelligence gathering, 
rational analysis, vigilance and accurate measurement” (Weick 2001:246).  
When an organisation assumes that the external environment is unanalysable, 
an entirely different strategy will apply. The organisation to some extent may create 
the external environment. The key is to construct, coerce, or enact a reasonable 
interpretation that makes previous action sensible and suggests some next steps (ibid.) 
 Weick explains differences in organisational beliefs about the environment with 
a combination of objective characteristics of the environment and managers’ previous 
interpretation experience; i.e. one static and one dynamic element. “When the 
environment is subjective, difficult to penetrate, or changing, managers will see it as 
less analysable” (ibid.).  
This point is a central one in organisation theory, and has been expressed in 
various ways. One explanation for why some organisations see their environments as 
“unanalysable” is that they receive contradicting feedback from it.  
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Another explanation – put forward by sociologists inspired by Niklas Luhman - 
focuses on internal communication. Autopoietic, or closed systems is their denotation 
of  organisations similar to those Weick describes as having “unanalysable 
environments”. Their argument is that organisations occupied by professionals -like 
doctors and other health personnel, lawyers or economists- develop “self-referentially” 
through “dense internal communication”. 
In the interest of “survival” [the organisation] continuously produces its internal 
structure without reference to any outside source. [The organisation] tries to 
maintain its essential identity and boundaries through perturbation, and it 
responds to the environment only to the extent that it is internally represented in 
such systems (Brans og Rossbach 1997: 432, Dunsire 1996: 302f). 
It follows that for such organisations, it is difficult for stakeholders in the 
environment to make their voice heard. And visa versa; a “self-referring” organisation 
will have difficulty of seeing the relevance of feedback from either clients or 
overseers. According to autopoiesis-theory, as illustrated by the quotation above, the 
environmental feedback most likely to be deemed relevant is the signals coming from 
peers, like colleagues. In fact, this central to the notion of professionalism is the 
assertion that what defines a professional is precisely the fact that he or she is only 
accountable to his or her peers (Carter, Klein and Day 1992:35). As a result, feedback 
coming from other sources – be it clients or non-professional managers - will easily be 
regarded as data of little concern rather than information.  
These are of course ideal categories. The “dynamic” explanatory component 
aside, real-life organisations will come somewhere on a continuum between having 
“analysable” or “unanalysable” environments. Nonetheless, it seems clear from the 
autopoiesis-line of argument that many of the key services performed by 
municipalities approach the “unanalysable”-end of the continuum. Organisations 
performing primary education, healthcare, child care and social services all fit the 
description outlined above fairly well, in that they are dominated by respective 
homogenous groups of notoriously self-conscious professionals. Of the departments 
whose change experiences are analysed in this thesis, Byskogen school, with its 
homogenous group of teachers, is clearly the best case of an organisation with an 
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“unanalysable” environment. Alongside doctors, teachers is the profession most 
“feared” by management theorists and practitioners alike.  
On the other end of the continuum come organisations performing various 
infrastructural services, like provision and maintenance of water, electricity, gas and 
roads. Such organisations seldom get contradicting feedback from the environment, 
and they are not dominated by strong groups of professionals. Hence, of the 
departments studied in this thesis, the Technical department is hypothesised to be an 
organisation with an “analysable” environment.  
The two remaining Larvik-departments are more difficult to place on the 
continuum. The Culture and sports department is not dominated by professionals. Still 
no good “answer” is apparently assumed to “be out there”. Mrs. Wold, the manager of 
the department, expresses that the department receives contradicting feedback from its 
environment. If attendance was the only measure of success, her job would have been 
easy, Mrs. Wold argues. She would then dedicate her efforts to “noting but football 
and brass bands” (interview). But her job is to satisfy even the  minority of  
stakeholders interested in the finer arts, she argues. “Our job is to see to it that 
everyone gets what they want, which means Pippi Langstrømpe and brass bands one 
week and classical piano and ballet the other” (interview). The point is that at any 
given moment, one group of stakeholders will be unhappy, no matter what the 
department does. As a result, I assume that the Culture and sports department 
perceives its environment as “unanalysable”. 
The Work and Employment department is impossible to place anywhere but in 
the middle of the continuum. This is a huge and complex department, made up of 
twelve very different sub-units, each of which dominated by respective professionals, 
like social workers, pedagogists and carpenters. Some of these sub-units probably 
perceive their environments as analysable, others not. The unit  
The Four Interpretation Modes 
Taken together, these two dimensions produce a two-times-two typology of ideal-type 
learning modes. Weick’s key argument is that the process of scanning, interpretation 
and response follows four characteristic behavioural patterns, corresponding to these 
four modes, enacting, discovering, conditioned viewing and undirected viewing. Note 
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that the last component, response, will not be focused in the following, as tracing 
actual courses of action escapes the empirical scrutinise of the chapters that follow.  
 
The Enacting Mode 
An organisation that assumes that the environment is unanalysable, but chooses an 
active intrusiveness strategy, is in an enacting learning mode. These organisations are 
highly activated. They “gather information by trying new behaviours and seeing what 
happens. They experiment, test and stimulate, and they ignore precedent, rules and 
traditional expectations” (Weick 2001:248). 
In terms of scanning behaviour, typical characteristics of organisations in an 
enacting mode is to make use of a wide variety of sources. Related to the discussion of 
performance indicators (PIs) in section 2.2.1 above, an enacting organisation typically 
makes use of data from the whole range of possible means; both instrumental tests and 
social tests like user surveys are utilised, as are the whole range of kinds of PIs from 
Figure 1. But since the environment is perceived as unanalysable, “tin openers” will be 
more frequent measures “outcome organisational efficiency” than “dials” (cf. p.14f). 
Note that all PIs are “impersonal” data sources, in that they their measurement 
do not involve direct contact between organisational managers and other individuals. 
However, an organisation in an enacting mode also makes use of “personal” data 
sources. In direct contact with stakeholders like overseers, colleagues, peers or 
customers, the organisation’s manager performs “social tests”, as often as not by 
experimenting and imposing new ideas on stakeholders (Weick 2001:250-251). This 
way the manager of an enacting organisation as much “shapes” as “receives” feedback 
from the environment. 
Recall that interpretation is the process by which feedback from the 
environment is translated into “information” (see discussion of this distinction on 
p.36). In the enacting mode,  interpretation processes are seldom standardised, and 
often a wide range of organisational participants are included in the interpretation 
process. The reason for this is that feedback will often be subject to multiple 
interpretations, due to the perception of the environment as unanalysable. As a result, 
organisational managers will typically include e.g. overseers and colleagues in 
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extensive deliberations over feedback, hoping to arrive at a sensible interpretation in 
concert (Weick 2001:251-252). 
 
The Discovering Mode 
An organisation that assumes that the environment is analysable, and chooses an active 
intrusiveness strategy is in a discovering learning mode. This mode also represents an 
intrusive organisation, but here “the emphasis is on detecting the correct answer 
already in an analysable environment rather than on shaping the answer” (Weick 
2001:248).  
As in the enacting mode, typical scanning behaviour in the discovering mode is 
to make use of the whole range of possible PIs. Unlike in the enacting mode, even 
outcome “dials” are frequently used in this mode, as the environment is perceived as 
analysable.  
Social tests are less frequently used than instrumental ones in constructing PIs. 
Typically, “carefully devised measurement probes are sent into the environment to 
relay information back to the organisation” (ibid.). Surveys to stakeholders is one 
example. Such and other “impersonal” data i.e. determine organisational 
interpretations about environmental characteristics and expectations (ibid.). “Personal” 
data sources are seldom used in this mode. 
As multiple interpretations are far between in discovering organisations, 
interpretation processes are to a large extent standardised, and typically the 
prerogative of the managers of the organisation.  
 
The Conditioned Viewing Mode 
Among those assuming that the environment is analysable, organisations with a 
passive intrusiveness strategy are in a conditioned viewing learning mode. They “tend 
to rely on established data collection procedures, and the interpretations are developed 
within traditional boundaries (Weick 2001:249). As the environment is perceived as 
objective and benevolent, the organisation does not take unusual steps to learn about 
stakeholders and their perceptions about the organisation’s performance. 
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Typically, scanning is conditioned in the sense it is limited to the “impersonal” 
data obtained routinely from reports on a few instrumental PIs. Similarly, 
interpretation is conditioned in the sense that it, like in the discovering mode, is fairly 
standardised and constrained to the managers of the organisation. 
 
The Undirected Viewing Mode 
An organisation that assumes that the environment is unanalysable, and chooses a 
passive intrusiveness strategy, is in an undirected viewing learning mode. As the 
managers of such organisations assume the environment to be unanalysable, they do 
not scan for hard, objective data. Rather, they act on limited, soft information to create 
their perceived environments (Weick 2001:249). 
Typical scanning behaviour in this mode is to make little use of formal, 
“impersonal” management data, like data from PIs. Any PIs in use are likely to be tin 
openers. Any formal performance reports will tend to be ad hoc and irregular. Rather 
than form such reports, however, management data will typically be obtained from 
personal contact with peers and colleagues (Weick 2001:251). Similarly to the 
enacting mode, interpretation is unstandardised. Managers of the organisation do not 
include stakeholders in the interpretation process, they typically struggle by 
themselves in trying to make sense of the often contradicting data.   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44 
Performance Management and Organisational Intelligence 
ORGANISATIONAL INTRUSIVENESS  
passive active 
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UNDIRECTED VIEWING  
Scanning characteristics: few 
formal sources – mostly personal, 
irregular. Outcome  PIs are tin 
openers. Irregular scanning 
activities. 
Interpretation process: 
unstandardised, exclusive 
ENACTING 
Scanning characteristics: data from 
many sources. Most outcome PIs are 
tin openers. Regular scanning 
activities. 
Interpretation process: 
unstandardised, extensive, inclusive, 
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Scanning characteristics: few 
sources, little and unsystematical 
formal data. Irregular scanning 
activities. 
Interpretation process: 
unstandardised, exclusive 
DISCOVERING 
Scanning characteristics: data from 
many sources. Most outcome PIs are 
“dials”. Regular scanning activities. 
Interpretation process: 
standardised, systematic, exclusive, 
“detecting the answer” 
 
Figure 5: A typology of organisational learning modes  
 
Hypothesis 3 – the BSC- reform and Organisational Learning 
The organisational learning modes-framework is not as deterministic as the 
contingency theory-approach. True, we have seen how “static” components to some 
extent explain why one organisation is in learning mode X, and another in mode Y. 
But compared with the contingency approach, the “dynamic” components are more 
important, especially in explaining an organisation’s place on the dimension active or 
passive intrusiveness mode. Hence, the learning modes-theory does not facilitate clear-
cut a priori hypothesises. Its potential analytical usefulness is to provide a framework 
for seeing patterns in the change experiences narrated in chapter four. Nonetheless, the 
following hypothesis is put forward, whose ambition is no more or less than to provide 
the starting point for reflection: 
 Over the period 1996-2000, the BSC reform will partly help, partly force all 
four departments studied into a more active intrusiveness mode. What this entails in 
terms of actual learning behaviour is contingent upon their assumptions about their 
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environments. Byskogen school and the Culture and Sports department, the 
departments assumed to perceive unanalysable environments, will move from a 
starting-point in an “undirected viewing” to an “enacting” learning mode. The 
technical department, assumed to perceive an analysable environment, will move from 
a “conditioned viewing” to a “discovering” learning mode. 
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2.5 Hypothesises Summarised 
Table 3 below summarises the hypothesises put forward in the present chapter. 
Table 3: Hypothesises summarised  
 
Source Hypothesises 
Management 
control 
(Wilson’s 
Contingency theory) 
1. Over the period 1996-2001, the BSC-reform will facilitate management 
control in relation to all four departments studied. What this entails in terms of 
actual management control practices is contingent upon the departments’ 
organisational technologies:  
• 1A: In the Technical department, an organisation characterised by 
production technology, we will observe a “close” control practice 
developing over time (cf. p.28) 
• 1B: In Byskogen school, an organisation characterised by coping 
technology, we will observe a “prospects-oriented” control practice 
developing over time (cf. p.29) 
• 1C: In the Work and Employment department and the Culture and Sports 
department, organisations characterised by craft technology, we will 
observe a “results-oriented” control practice developing over time (cf. 
p.30f) 
Strategic 
management 
(Management 
control) 
2: Over the period studied, 1996-2001, I expect to find a hierarchy of objectives 
emerging in relation to all four departments studied (cf. p.32f) 
Organisational 
learning 
(Weick’s Learning 
modes-theory) 
3: Over the period 1996-2001, the BSC reform will partly help, partly force all 
four departments studied into a more active intrusiveness mode. What this 
entails in terms of actual learning behaviour is contingent upon the departments’ 
assumptions about their environments (cf. p.45f) 
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN  
 
 
The empirical material presented in this thesis is clinical research into a local 
government experience in which a Balanced Scorecard was implemented over a period 
of five years, 1996-2001. The thesis compares the parallel change experiences of four 
functional departments within the context of one large governmental organisation, 
Larvik Municipality in Norway. Section 3.1 outlines how this material is put to work 
to “test” the hypothesises put forward in the previous chapter. Section 3.2 gives some 
background information on the “administrative situation” (Simon 1946) of Larvik and 
the four departments studied: The Technical department, the Culture and sports 
department, Byskogen school and the Work and Employment department. Section 3.3 
provides a methodological discussion of the research design. 
3.1 How the Hypothesises are Put to the Test 
The preceding chapter served to present two bulks of hypothesises. Hypothesises 1, 
1A-1C and 2 - all related to the BSC-reform’s effect on management control - were 
presented on pages 27-33. Hypothesis 3 - about the reform’s effect on organisational 
learning in the organisation – was presented on pages 45-46. The present chapter 
explains how each of these hypothesises, five in all, will be made subject to empirical 
scrutiny; in other words how the hypothesises are “tested”. 
3.1.1 Testing hypothesis 1, about the BSC-reform and management control  
Recall that hypothesis 1 is that over the period 1996-2001, the BSC-reform will 
facilitate management control in relation to all four departments studied. Hypothesises 
1A-1C pertain to the more specific entailments of management control practices across 
the departments. The nil-hypothesis is that the management control practice did not 
vary substantially across the departments. 
 In relation to hypothesises 1 and 1A-1C, my narration of the change 
experiences will be guided by Dunsire’s three components of management control: 
The director component is rules and routines related to the identification of 
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performance indicators for the department (cf. p.7). Here, document studies of the 
annual department plans will be central. Important questions will be how many and 
what kind of performance indicators (PIs) did the departments use. A second 
interesting aspect is how these PIs were set. Who participated, and in what way? To 
find out about this latter aspect I will use material from interviews with department 
managers and my informants in upper management. 
The detector component is rules and routines related to how the departments report 
their performance on these indicators (cf. p.7). The effector component is rules and 
routines related to how the apex of the municipality acts on the information in the 
performance reports in order to correct the departments’ behaviour (cf. p.7). To narrate 
the departments’ experiences on these two components, I will study the annual, tertiary 
and monthly control reports and make use of the above-mentioned interview material.
  
3.1.2 Testing hypothesis 2, about the BSC-reform and  strategic management  
Recall from page 32f that hypothesis 2 is that the BSC-reform has facilitated strategic 
management in Larvik. I.e., over the period studied, 1996-2001, we expect to find a 
hierarchy of objectives emerging in relation to all the four departments studied. The 
nil-hypothesis is that a hierarchy of objectives did not emerge. 
 To assess whether strategy is “translated into action”, I will compare the annual 
department plans of the departments with the annual action plans of the municipality 
in search of a hierarchy of objectives. Are the official municipality-wide objectives 
reflected in the PIs in the departments’ action plans? Moreover, are changes in 
municipal objectives over time reflected in changes in the department plans?  
In the third period of the change experience, 2000-2001, the departments were 
required to state in their department plans how they intended to excel on each and 
every one of the PIs. I will assess whether this was done – to the extent PIs for 
municipality-wide objectives were developed at all.  
In addition, I will make use of material from interviews with the department 
managers to find out to what extent they feel obliged to dedicate their efforts to 
achieve well on these municipal-wide objectives.  
49 
Performance Management and Organisational Intelligence 
3.1.3 Testing hypothesises 3  about the BSC-reform and organisational learning 
Recall from page 45 that hypothesis 3 is that over the period 1996-2000, the BSC 
reform will have partly helped, partly forced all four departments studied into a more 
active intrusiveness mode. What this entails in terms of actual learning behaviour is 
contingent upon their assumptions about their environments. Byskogen school and the 
Culture and Sports department, the departments assumed to perceive unanalysable 
environments, will move from a starting-point in an “undirected viewing” learning to 
an “enacting” mode. The technical department, assumed to perceive an analysable 
environment, will move from a “conditioned viewing” to a “discovering” learning 
mode. The nil-hypothesis is that the reform did not bring the departments into a more 
active intrusiveness mode.  
In “testing” hypothesis 3, the first two of the three components of learning –
scanning and interpretation behaviour will frame my narration of the departments’ 
change experiences (cf. p.36, 42ff). The third component, response behaviour, - a 
(new) response or action based on interpretation- escapes the scope of this thesis. 
Performance on the PIs in their respective action plans, either measured by 
themselves or by stakeholders in their environment, will be the most important 
feedback the departments receive from the environment. Hence, the best indicator of 
scanning behaviour of departments is what PIs they make use of. My treatment of 
scanning behaviour will i.e. somewhat overlap the director component in my treatment 
of hypothesises 1A-1C. Central questions are: How many PIs are used in the 
respective action plans; what sort of PIs are used (cf. section 2.2.1 on p.12ff); and who 
were involved in setting them. Material from both document studies and interviews 
will be used to assess these questions.  
Several questions are important in depicting interpretation behaviour: Who 
were involved in the process of interpreting feedback? Only the department 
managers?; stakeholders like overseers, clients or colleagues in the department?, or 
even peers outside the department? Moreover, in which fora did interpretation take 
place? The prime source of material for assessment of these questions will be 
interviews with the four department managers, the CEO and the Financial Officer in 
Larvik municipality. 
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3.2 Background information 
3.2.1 The Change Experience of Larvik Municipality 
To understand the “administrative situation” (Simon 1946) that makes up the context 
for the events studied, some background on Larvik municipality is required. A 
Norwegian local council, a municipality, is lead by a council of locally elected 
politicians. The administration is headed by a chief executive officer (CEO), and 
divided into functional departments providing the inhabitants with various services. A 
municipality provides all governmental services in the local community (except 
policing).  
Larvik Municipality was formed in 1988 out of the city-municipality Larvik and 
the four surrounding municipalities Hedrum, Tjølling, Stavern and Brunlanes. Larvik 
is a large municipality by Norwegian standards, with 530 square kilometres and 
40.088 inhabitants. The administration has 2.700 employees. According to the 
classification of the Norwegian Department of Municipalities and Regions, Larvik is a 
large, low-income municipality.  
Traditionally, the Labour party has governed Larvik. But since 1995 the parties 
in the centre or in the right end of the political spectre have been in majority in the 
council. In the period 1995-1999 the conservatives (Høyre) and the agrarian centre 
party (Senterpartiet) held joint power. Today (1999-2003) the conservatives share 
power with the progressive party (Fremskrittspartiet). Mrs. Holtskog was appointed 
CEO of Larvik in 1995. The current CEO, Mr. Einar Gaustad, took over the position 
early in 1999.  
The change experience studied started in 1996. At that time, in part as a 
response demands for economic cut-backs, the newly elected centre-conservative 
political coalition and the new CEO of Larvik municipality agreed to implement a new 
model of management in the administration, along the lines of what this thesis has 
defined as a Balanced Scorecard. All administrative units were required to contribute.  
As a result, quite drastic structural changes were made over the period 1996 to 
2001. The handful of functional sectors, like health, work, school, culture and 
technical were dissolved into 65 result units. Each elderly home, each cultural 
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institution and each school, like Byskogen, became “result units” – or departments –, 
and were delegated powers that gave them much discretion from hierarchical 
interference. Along with the sector-level went the sector heads. They were replaced 
with three functional “municipality directors”, directly under the CEO. The heads of 
each department were given the status of department managers. I.e., all the four 
departments studied here were established as result units in 1996. 
By 2001, the middle-level (the municipality directors) had been removed, 
leaving an extremely flat organisation cart, as illustrated in Figure 6 below. 
 
Figure 6: Organisation chart of Larvik Municipality 2001 
 
3.2.2 Background on the Departments 
The Technical department was established as a result unit in 1996. Before then it 
was a part of the larger technical sector, together with the fire department, the planning 
department and the electricity department. The Technical department is responsible for 
maintenance of public roads and parking spaces, including traffic safety and traffic 
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lights; building, running and maintaining the public water transportation and sewage 
systems; renovation and recycling of domestic waste; running and maintaining public 
parks and toilets, sports facilities and playgrounds; and developing public residential- 
and industrial areas. The technical department has 90 employees, and since 1996 is has 
been headed by Mr. Knut Hjalmar Gulliksen. 
The Work and Employment department was also established as a result unit 
in 1996. The department aims to “provide work or other occupation to people whose 
work-capacity or competence is unresolved and to people who for some other reason 
have not made a choice of occupation ” (department plan 2001:2). The overall goal of 
the department is to empower people; get people off benefits and into paid occupation. 
Related to this, the department works to help immigrants get integrated in the 
community. Typical clients are immigrants without the necessary language skills, 
physically challenged and mentally ill people. The department is made up of 11 sub-
units, with their own managers. These all provide work-related training, like language 
skills, technical skills and social skills. In total the department has 60 employees. Since 
1997 Mr. Audun Auby has headed the department. 
The Culture and Sports department was established in 1996. Before then it 
was part of the larger cultural sector in the municipality, together with institutions like 
the library, museums and the cinema. The department is responsible for arranging and 
facilitating cultural activities like music, dance, theatre, literature, arts and sports and 
other outdoor activities. The department targets both the public at large and prioritised 
groups like children, elderly, immigrants, physically disabled and mentally challenged. 
In part the department has its own arrangements, and in part it guides and 
economically supports the relevant organisations from the voluntary sector. Since 
1996 Mrs. Marit Wold has headed the department. 
Byskogen primary school is one of the largest of the municipality’s 25 
primary schools. Since 1995 the principal of the school has been Mrs. Eva Børven 
Olsen.  
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3.3 Methodology 
This thesis has an embedded multiple-case design, in that it compares the  change 
experiences of across four organisational units (Yin 1994: 51). The analytical focus is 
on case study settings, a method of investigation that facilitates the study of 
phenomena in more depth. 
A key design choice was what organisational units to study. I wanted my choice 
to rise to the challenge posed by Hyndman and Eden. In their comparison of several 
UK executive agencies in the 1990s, the authors conclude that to understand the 
operation of performance management systems, and to encourage the development of 
more appropriate ones, clinical research dis-aggregated into areas of service activity 
within the wider agency is needed Hyndman and Eden (2000:189). I.e., my decision 
fell on studying the parallel change experiences of four functional departments within 
the context of one large governmental organisation, Larvik Municipality in Norway: 
the Technical department, the Culture and sports department, Byskogen school and the 
Work and Employment department.  
Within these case study settings the study explores how the departments have 
“improvised” the implementation of the balanced scorecard. “Improvisation” is a term 
used by Karl E. Weick to describe change processes that cannot be subject to 
“command and control”, because the end-state is not clearly defined, and “the road is 
made while underway”. Improvisation is not without control, however. It is controlled 
by frames of reference, embodied in such things as the vocabulary of the organisation, 
procedural and substantive routines and socialisation practices (Weick 2001:77). 
The methodological implication of my choice of units of study was that my 
multiple-case study would have a “most similar”-design (Lijphart 1975:163). This is a 
design suited to explain differences in outcome (i.e. “value” on the dependent variable) 
among a set of very similar cases (i.e. most independent variables are equal across the 
cases). In order to isolate the “critical difference” (i.e. the one independent variable) 
that explains the observed difference in outcome, the researcher strives for similarity 
on as many as possible of the “control variables” – the independent variables that 
might explain the outcome.  
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In my research design, the “dependent variable” is differences in management 
accounting practices. However, the departments are similar in most respects.: Their 
context is similar, in that they share a common national, historical and geographical 
setting. Furthermore, at the start of the change experience in 1996, their 
“administrative situation” (Simon 1946) was much the same: They were all under 
economic strain, and all faced the challenge posed by changes in both political and 
administrative leadership. And most importantly, during the whole 1996-2001, they 
shared the same pressure from upper political and administrative management to 
implement a balanced scorecard. These are all features (i.e. ”independent variables”) 
that might have explained differences in outcome, if they varied. The fact that these do 
not vary in my design, that they in fact are equal across the departments, is how I try to 
keep the “control variables” constant. 
The one independent variable that guided my choice of departments within 
Larvik – the “critical difference” assumed to explain the differences in management 
accounting practices - was “organisational technology”; the theoretical framework 
outlined in section 2.3 above. The four departments mentioned were i.e. neither chosen 
arbitrarily, nor pushed forward by the CEO as his “shining examples”. They were 
selected by the researcher from the “menu” of 65 departments because they 
represented the desired variety in “organisational technologies”. The departments’ 
variety on this aspect provided a site for “testing” hypothesises 1A-1C,  produced by 
the contingency theory framework. 
A better design would obviously be to include more units of observation; 
preferably at least two departments representing each ideal-type organisational 
technology. Such a design could reveal whether departments with the same 
organisational technology – contrary to my hypothesis - showed different 
improvisations of the BSC-reform. However, such a design by far escapes the scope 
and – not least – the research economy of this thesis. 
 
Research methods 
In examining the issues at stake the thesis has sought to achieve a triangulation 
(Denzin 1978). The material used to narrate the change experiences in Larvik stems 
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from two sources, interviews and document studies. I interviewed the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO), Mr. Gaustad, the Financial Officer (FO), Mr. Hellnes, and the 
executive managers of each of the four departments studied. The six interviews, 
performed 26.06.-27.06.2001, were thematic, semi-directed individual interviews and 
lasted approximately one hour each.  
 To avoid the problems posed by a weak memory and slow hand-writing, a tape 
recorder was used throughout. These recordings were subsequently transcripted word-
by-word by the researcher. As such, the reliability of the interview material is high. In 
general, the presence of a tape recorder is said to pose the risk of a decreased quality of 
information, as informants put restrictions upon themselves at the sight of it. This was 
not a problem in this case, as I asked for no confidential or compromitting information. 
None were needed for the purposes of this study. 
Obviously, the interviews were conducted in Norwegian. The material used is 
hence translated to English by the researcher. This might be considered a problem for 
reliability, as meaning and connotations might get lost in the translation. All interview 
persons have been given the opportunity to read through the quotes used, though, and 
no complaints were made. 
In addition to the interview material I have studied all available factual accounts 
of the change experiences. For the whole period, 1996-2001, I have studied all annual 
department plans [virksomhetsplaner], monthly and tertiary performance reports and 
manager contracts from each of the four departments. None of these are available to 
the general public. In addition, I have read the annual municipal plans and reports 
[årsplaner og årsrapporter]. These are available to the public. 
The key part of the document studies has been the analysis of performance 
indicators (PIs) in the annual department plans. In the following chapter, these PIs are 
referred to in accordance with the typology outlined on p.12-15 and illustrated by 
Figure 1 on p.15. The reliability of this method should be acceptable, as these 
department plans are available to anyone who would care to ask for them. Moreover, 
although not clear-cut, the PI-typology is thoroughly outlined, based on work by 
established theorists, and well illustrated both on p.12-15 and in the narration 
throughout chapter four.  
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Part 2 ANALYSIS 
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4 Case Material 
 
 
I will narrate the 1996-2001 change experiences of the four departments in three bulks, 
1996-1999, 1999-2000 and 2000-2001, in accordance with what my informants all 
agree are the milestones in the Larvik change experience (interviews). 
4.1 First Period, 1996-1999 
As mentioned, the change experiences started in 1996, when the newly elected centre-
conservative   political coalition and the new CEO of Larvik municipality agreed to 
implement a new model of management in the administration, along the lines of what 
this thesis has defined as a performance management model..  
Some quite drastic structural changes were made. The handful of functional 
sectors, like health, work, school, culture and technical were dissolved into 65 result 
units. Each elderly home, each cultural institution and each school, like Byskogen, 
became “result units” – or departments –, and were delegated powers that gave them 
much discretion from hierarchical interference7. Along with the sector-level went the 
sector heads. They were replaced with three functional “municipality directors”, 
directly under the CEO. The heads of each department were given the status of 
department managers. I.e., all the four departments studied here were established as 
result units in 1996. 
The rest of the main changes to the management system are summarised below, 
under the headings of management control, strategic management and organisational 
learning respectively. Sections 4.1.1 - 4.1.4 will show how these changes to the 
structures and rules for the performance management system were improvised 
somewhat differently across our four departments. Section 4.1.5. summarises the 
observations.  
 
 
                                                          
7 Cf. discussion of “responsibility centres, in footnote 1 on page 5 
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Management control 
What management control practices were planned in this period? As for the director 
and detector components of management control, the municipality’s 2. tertiary report 
from 1999 states that in this period, measuring and reporting of performance was a 
central element in and a prerequisite for the flat organisational model. A 
“prerequisite”, because the wide delegation of authority to the departments meant that 
detailed knowledge and oversight about activities and budgets would only be at 
department level (p. 2). Indeed, the director component was that the departments were 
required to develop an annual budget for the department, in which they were to 
identify several financial PIs and some non-financial PIs for the coming year’s 
activity. The detector component was a system of tertiary reporting of performance on 
both the financial and the non-financial PIs (1998 Annual report). 
The main effector component was the introduction in 1998 of a system for 
transferring of the departments’ over- and under-consumption of funds (relative to 
budget) from one year to the next (1999 Annual report). In 1998 the system was only 
partially implemented though, in that no over-consumption was transferred, and only 
parts of the under-consumption was. The reasons were that the departments needed 
some time to get used to the system and that the municipality had economic 
difficulties, respectively (1998 Annual report). 
Strategic management 
I do not interpret any of the managerial interventions in this first period as attempts to 
enhance strategic management in the organisation.  
Organisational learning 
Only modest alterations to the departments’ learning behaviour were intended in this 
period. As mentioned on p.50, my treatment of scanning behaviour will overlap the 
director component, since a good indicator of the departments’ scanning behaviour is 
what PIs they make use of. Hence, the requirement on the part of the departments to 
develop non-financial PIs, and to assess actual performance on these every tertiary, 
was indeed an attempt to bring the departments into a more active intrusiveness mode. 
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If nothing else, this requirement would mean that the department would have to get 
involved with regular scanning activities. 
4.1.1 First Period, 1996-1999, the Technical department 
In addition to the identification of the limited number of PIs that were to be reported 
tertiary to the CEO, the manager of the Technical department, Mr. Gulliksen, made 
annual “department plans” (a financial and non-financial/operational budget). He 
started working on the first of these in 1997, to plan 1998. As the 1999 department 
plan is very similar in both format and content, I will only describe the 1998-plan. In 
the 19-page department plan for 1998, “expenses”, “result goals”, “projects” and 
“activity” were listed for each of the department’s four core areas of activity; roads, 
water, sewage etc. plus administration. 
All areas of activity taken together, ten PIs were listed.  
• Nine of which were outcome dials (e.g. “no consumers shall ever be without 
water for more than 12 hours continuously”, p.8), and 
• one was a process dial (“receive no complaints from consumers about the 
quality of maintenance of [a list of recreational areas]”[a social test]).   
• Eight of these ten PIs were instrumental tests; two were social tests.  
In the foreword to the department plan for 1999, Mr. Gulliksen has written that the 
plan was developed in a process that started in the fall of 1998, and where “several 
people” had participated. Nonetheless, of the processes leading to the department plans 
for both 1998 and 1999, and the result goals in them, Mr. Gulliksen says in hindsight 
that the inclusion of staff was neither very deep nor broad. The department plans for 
1998 and 1999 were mainly plans developed by himself and his closest aides, for the 
rest of the staff (interview).  
The financial and ten non-financial PIs were reported tertiary. And in the third 
tertiary report, Mr. Gulliksen wrote short comments to all deviations from the plan 
(1998 Annual report).  
In addition there was indeed a manager-contract between Mr. Gulliksen and the 
relevant middle-line director of the municipality since 1996, but this contract was not 
specific about department performance. It was more about loyalty towards the 
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municipality and about the manager’s obligation to respect legal frames and tariffs 
(interview).    
For 1998 the Technical department had an over-consumption of funds relative to 
budget of NOK 4,1m. This was not transferred to the 1999 budget. 
4.1.2 First Period, 1996-1999, the Work and Employment department 
The Work and Employment department did not develop department plans in this 
period. Hence, what PIs that were agreed between the manager, Mr. Auby, and the 
CEO must be read off the tertiary reports.  
In 1998, eleven non-financial PIs were set down (1998 Annual report), 
• Two of which were outcome dials (e.g. 54 clients in activity at Gjærstad 
activity-centre), 
• one was an outcome tin-opener (45  benefit claimants shall be transferred to 
paid occupation), and 
• eight were structural dials (e.g. reorganise the department so that quantified 
goals can be achieved in the future). 
• All eleven PIs were instrumental 
The financial and 11 non-financial PIs were reported tertiary. And in the third 
tertiary report, Mr. Auby wrote short comments to all deviations from the plan (1998 
Annual report). 
For 1998 the Work and Employment department had an under-consumption of 
funds relative to budget of NOK 164.000. This was transferred to the 1999 budget. 
4.1.3 First Period, 1996-1999, The Culture and Sports department 
The Culture and Sports department did not develop department plans in this period, 
only “straightforward activity-plans, for use inside the department only” (interview). 
Hence, what PIs that were agreed between the CEO and the department manager, Mrs. 
Wold, must be read off the tertiary reports.  
In 1998, five non-financial PIs were set down (1998 Annual report), 
• Four of which were outcome dials (e.g. 16 theatre plays for children), and 
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• one was an outcome tin-opener (25.000 visits to communal swimming 
facilities). 
• All five PIs were instrumental tests. 
The financial and five non-financial PIs were reported tertiary. And in the third 
tertiary report, Mrs. Wold wrote short comments to all deviations from the plan (1998 
Annual report). 
For 1998 the Culture and Sports department had an under-consumption of funds 
relative to budget of NOK 138.000. This was transferred to the 1999 budget. 
4.1.4 First Period, 1996-1999, Byskogen primary school 
The principal, Mrs. Olsen, made department plans for all years in this period, 1997, 
1998 and 1999, after a model she had developed herself and was very happy with 
(interview). These plans had, like the Technical department’s, lists of “activities” 
divided into focus areas. I.e., they are simply long lists of everything the department 
plans do over the coming year, when they are supposed to be completed and who is 
responsible. As an illustration, the 1998 department plan has 37 items on this list. To 
the extent these can be seen as performance indicators, they are all structural dials. 
Most items are about development of facilities and training of staff, like  “buy 
equipment for art classes”, “teach the teachers how to use the Internet” and “start a 
choir for the personnel”.  
Mrs. Olsen agreed to choose three of these structural dials/“activities” as focus 
areas for the school, and report performance on them tertiary to the CEO. Apart from 
these 37, that can hardly be considered “real” PIs, the department reported on five non-
financial PIs in 1998 (1998 Annual report). 
• One of which was an outcome tin opener (Reading skills in 5th grade), 
• three were structural dials (e.g. 12 pupils per teacher on average), and  
• one was a structural tin-openers (83% of 6th graders shall feel comfortable at 
school [a social test]). 
• One of the five PIs was a social tests, the rest instrumental. 
For 1998 Byskogen had an under-consumption of funds relative to budget of NOK 
12.000. This was transferred to the 1999 budget. 
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4.1.5 First Period, 1996-1999, Summary of observations 
We see that the management system in important ways worked similarly across the 
four departments. All reported tertiary on both financial and non-financial PIs, in 
accordance with the procedure decided by the CEO. And the budget-transferring 
system worked similar, as far as it had been implemented.  
Nonetheless, we can also observe that in spite of the common structures and 
rules, there were some differences in management control practices across the 
departments. One is whether department plans were developed, as the Culture and 
sports department did not do so in this period. The second relates to the number of PIs 
the departments reported on in their tertiary performance reports to the CEO: from 11 
(Work and employment) and ten (Technical) to five (Byskogen and Culture and 
sports). The third difference is the kinds of PIs the departments reported on. Only two 
of the departments developed socially tested PIs in addition to instrumental ones 
(Technical and Byskogen), the other two only instrumental.  
In terms of learning behaviour, this means that by 1999, the reform had brought  
all four departments into a slightly more active intrusiveness mode. The requirement 
upon them to issue tertiary performance reports meant that all departments now 
conducted regular scanning activities. Other than the minor differences in number and 
kinds of PIs mentioned above, no differences in learning behaviour deserves 
mentioning in this first period. 
4.2 Second Period, 1999-2000 
In 1999, the economic problems in Larvik forced the politicians to look for new ways 
of cutting down costs. At this point, they brought in Mr. Einar Gaustad as CEO, as 
replacement for Mrs. Holtskog. In order to increase financial control, the politicians 
gave Mr. Gaustad wide delegations and discretion to implement the management 
accounting and control system “the total balance scorecard”; a system Mr. Gaustad 
brought with him from his previous position as CEO in another municipality (2. 
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tertiary report 1999, interview)8. Accordingly, building on the 1996-1999-foundation, 
Mr. Gaustad made several changes to the management system9.  
The remainder of the middle-line between the CEO and the departments - the 
three communal directors - were removed in March 2000, and the department 
managers were delegated full authority over their respective budgeting, wages, 
personnel issues and service delivery (Annual Report 1999, interview). 
The rest of the main changes to the management system are summarised below, 
under the headings of management control, strategic management and organisational 
learning respectively. As sections 4.2.1 - 4.2.4 will show, these changes to the 
structures and rules for the performance management system were improvised 
somewhat differently across our four departments. Section 4.2.5. summarises the 
observations. 
Management control 
The main change to the director component of management control was that all 
managers were required to develop annual department plans, starting in 1999 with the 
planning of 2000. The format was not dictated, but economic PIs apart, the 
departments were required to include in their department plans three “municipality-
wide” PIs for work environment (see below). In addition, all departments were urged 
to develop and include in the plan specific PIs for their respective service areas, either 
quantified or “verbal” (2. tertiary report 1999, p.2, interview).  
The main change in the detector component was that from 2000, all department 
managers were required to write monthly and tertiary performance reports to the CEO. 
The monthly reports should include quantified information on the PIs for economy and 
the three “municipality-wide” PIs for work environment. The tertiary reports, due 30. 
April, 31. August and 31. December, were to include information on other non-
financial performance as well, related to PIs in the department plans. The third tertiary 
report would also serve as the annual end-of-the-year-performance report from the 
                                                          
8 The “Total” BSC supplements the above-mentioned financial-, user- and internal business perspectives with the 
environmental perspective (Public Annual report from Larvik municipality, 1999).  
9 An important related event was the start of the so-called “Ronja-jump”, named after Ronja, the fictitious little girl who 
made a seemingly impossible jump across a canyon in a book by Astrid Lindgren. In Larvik, the “Ronja-jump” labelled an 
extensive cut-back process, initiated in the summer of 1999. All departments were required to make suggestions on how they 
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department. Both the monthly and tertiary reports were to be based on standard forms, 
developed by the CEO unit (see example of standard form attached).   
Three important changes were made to the effector component. First, in case of 
deviations from the plan, both the monthly and the tertiary reports were to include 
information on what measures the manager had taken or was planning to take in order 
to get back on track. I interpret this as an effector mechanism because it would provide 
a strong incentive for the managers to keep their respective departments “on track”. 
Their professional pride would gear them to make efforts to avoid showing off poor 
performance. Also, information on whether the manager needed help to get back on 
track was to be included (2. tertiary report 1999, p.2, interview). In fact, the standard 
forms for monthly and tertiary reports had separate columns for “deviations”, “efforts 
taken” and “support needed”. For each PI, the department managers were to write 
“yes” or “no” in the “deviations”-column, and in case of “no”, also fill out the two 
other columns.  
The second change was the full introduction of the transferring system for over- 
and under-consumption of funds, relative to budget. Now a department’s over-
consumption would lead to an equivalent reduction in its budget for the following 
year10.  
The third effector-related change was that from 2000, all department managers 
would have performance-based “manager contracts” with the CEO, with specified 
links to the PIs in their department plans. These contracts would be revised annually 
(interview).  
Strategic management 
As mentioned above, starting in 1999, the departments were required to include three 
“municipality-wide” PIs in their department plans, and report on them every month. I 
interpret this requirement as an effort done by the CEO to establish a hierarchy of 
objectives; i.e. an effort to enhance strategic management in the organisation.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
could contribute to the goal of a 11% cut-back in total costs over three years. Over NOK 70 millions (about £5,5 millions) 
was to be slashed in 1999 alone. 
10 Within a 5% limit of budget. If a department had an under- or over-consumption of funds of e.g. 7% of its budget, only 5% 
was to be transferred to next year’s budget (interview with the Financial Officer)  
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These three “municipality-wide” PIs were all measures of work environment; 
i.e. measures of structural organisational efficiency (cf. p.13). One was a structural 
dial: the ratio of the department’s employees who have a one-to-one employee-
conversation with the manager; one was a structural tin-opener: total sick leave; and 
one was something in-between: the number of accepted suggestions from the 
employees for department improvements11. 
 
Organisational learning 
Changes were also made with intent to enhance organisational learning in the 
organisation. In terms of scanning behaviour, the CEO wanted the departments to 
make more systematic use of views and other feedback from stakeholders like users 
and staff. As a result, from 1999, the CEO unit conducted standardised work climate 
surveys [klimaundersøkelser] in all departments and a user survey among the 
inhabitants. This survey took the form of a questionnaire with questions about the 
inhabitants satisfaction with all services provided [brukerundersøkelser] (interview 
with Mr. Hellenes). 
In order to enhance interpretation behaviour in the organisation, the 
department managers were to have two individual annual meetings with their 
superiors. They were to meet once a year with the CEO, to discuss overall 
departmental performance [medarbeidersamtale] and discuss revision of the manager 
contract, and once with some other CEO representative to discuss how to follow up on 
the results of the user- and staff surveys in particular (interview with Mrs. Olsen).  
4.2.1 Second Period, 1999-2000, the Technical department 
In developing the department plan for 2000 and its PIs, Mr. Gulliksen involved all his 
employees. The employees worked in groups to identify and specify PIs within their 
respective parts of the department (interview). Performance on the department’s PIs 
                                                          
11 This PI has two aspects. The first, whether suggestions are brought out or not, I consider to be a dial. The second is 
whether suggestions are accepted. To some extent this too is a dial, as it can be a matter of the good-will and openness of the 
department manager. But the quality of the suggestions obviously also play in. Hence, I denote this structural PI as something 
in-between a dial and a tin-opener.  
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were reported on monthly and tertiary, and Mr. Gulliksen signed a manager contract in 
this period; everything in accordance with the procedures the CEO had decided. 
Mr. Gulliksen did include the three municipality-wide PIs in his department plan 
for 2000; a plan with in total 26 non-financial PIs:  
• 18 of which were outcome-dials (e.g. 85% of all tests of drinking water shall be 
of satisfactory quality, p.8),  
• seven were structural dials (e.g. “Within December 1. all employees shall 
receive a job-description [stillingsinstruks] and have a plan for development of 
individual professional competence and involvement”, p.19), and  
• one was a structural tin-opener (Percentage sick-leave, p.19).  
• all 26 PIs were instrumental tests.  
For 1999 the Technical department had an over-consumption of funds relative to 
budget of NOK 433.000. This was transferred to the 2000 budget.  
As for learning behaviour, the user survey the CEO unit conducted among all 
inhabitants spurred the Technical to engage in more active scanning and interpretation 
behaviour. The year when a “sorting and recycling system” for domestic waste was 
introduced in the municipality, the Technical department received “massive critique 
and a terrible score on the user survey” (interview with Mr. Gulliksen). But the data 
from the user survey was very general, ala 1-10 ratings on questions like “how 
satisfied are you with the renovation services in Larvik””, and i.e. difficult to interpret. 
Mr. Gulliksen explains how the department used the negative result: 
If you ask general questions, you get general feedback. If you ask more specific 
questions, you get something else. I guess you can say that the general user survey 
was useful to us because it gave us reason to find out more. It was an indication 
that something had to be done (interview) 
What the department did, was to conduct a more specific user survey, with e.g. 
questions about the renovation services and the recycling system. The feedback 
obtained from this survey was in turn used directly in the development of the 
department’s services. 
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4.2.2 Second Period, 1999-2000, the Work and Employment department 
The department issued monthly and tertiary performance reports in this period, in 
accordance with the procedures the CEO had decided.  
Mr. Auby did include the three municipality-wide PIs in his department plan for 
2000; a plan with in total nine non-financial PIs: 
• one was an outcome tin-opener (27% of all benefit claimants shall be 
transferred to paid occupation or the national insurance scheme, p.12),  
• seven were structural dials (e.g. within 01.02.00 have a plan for individual 
employee training, related to the respective position instructions, p.12), and  
• one was a structural tin-opener (percentage sick-leave, p.19).  
• All nine PIs were instrumental tests.  
For 1999 the Work and Employment department had an over-consumption of funds 
relative to budget of NOK 200.000. This was transferred to the 2000 budget. 
As for learning behaviour, Mr. Auby participated in the two annual meetings with 
superiors, and hence followed the procedures laid down by the CEO.  
4.2.3 Second Period, 1999-2000, the Culture and Sports department 
The department manager, Mrs. Wold, did develop a department plan for 2000, but not 
one with PIs ready for assessment. It was more akin to the internal work-plans the 
departments used to have than the plans developed by the other three departments in 
this period. In Mrs. Wold’s own words, the 2000-department plan for the Culture and 
Sports department was “much like a list of what we were going to do at 1pm and 2pm 
in January and February” (interview). 
  Hence, what PIs that were agreed between the head, Mrs. Wold, and the CEO 
must again be read off the department’s monthly and tertiary performance reports.  In 
2000, the department reported on five non-financial PIs, including the three 
municipality-wide ones (1998 Annual report): 
• four of which were outcome dials (e.g. 16 theatre plays for children), and  
• one was an outcome tin-opener (25.000 visits to communal swimming 
facilities). 
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• All five PIs were instrumental tests.  
For 1999 the Culture and Sports department had an under-consumption of funds 
relative to budget of NOK 297.000. This was transferred to the 2000 budget. 
Mrs. Wold did not sign a manager contract with the CEO in this period, simply 
because she “did not get around to do it” (interview). 
As for learning behaviour, Mrs. Wold participated in the two annual meetings 
with superiors, and hence followed the procedures laid down by the CEO. 
4.2.4 Second Period, 1999-2000, Byskogen primary school 
Mrs. Olsen did include the three municipality-wide PIs in her department plan for 
2000; a plan with in total 12 non-financial PIs:  
• one was an outcome dial (20% of all pupils use IT for school work regularly),  
• eight were structural dials (e.g. 38% of all work shall be performed by full-time 
employees), and  
• three were structural tin openers (e.g. 70% of all employees feel they get the 
training they need to perform their job well [a social test]). 
• Three of the 12 PIs were social tests; nine were instrumental.  
The department’s PIs were reported on monthly and tertiary, according to the 
procedures the CEO had decided. Mrs. Olsen did not sign a manager contract with the 
CEO in this period, though, because the powerful Norwegian teachers’ union strongly 
warned her and the other principals in the municipality against signing. The union 
feared for the teachers’ professional discretion and wage-restrictions (interviews with 
Mrs. Olsen and Mr. Gaustad). 
For 1999 Byskogen had an under-consumption of funds relative to budget of NOK 
19.000. This was transferred to the 2000 budget. 
 As for learning behaviour, Mrs. Olsen describes the data obtained from user 
and staff surveys as rather difficult to interpret. Asked what implications a good or bad 
result on the user surveys had for her, this was her answer: 
The thing is, I know that external factors obviously play in [on the score/result]. But 
I can try to identify those factors and say “that is not my responsibility”. It can be 
poor maintenance of buildings, not enough resources for new books and so on. But 
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what is dependent on the job I do, is whether the school is well organised, whether 
the parents receive good information, whether the parents have a say, whether the 
teachers respect the pupils and so on (interview). 
However, she did find that the annual meetings with a CEO representative were 
helpful in interpreting such data: 
In the case of a poor result on any of the surveys, we discuss what efforts I should 
be thinking about making. (…) But in these discussions, it is me as a manager 
who’s responsible for drawing the conclusions and implementing the necessary 
changes. The people from the CEO unit just assist; they never take over the 
responsibility (interview). 
4.2.5 Second Period, 1999-2000, Summary of observations 
We see that in terms of management control practices, Mr. Gaustad’s performance 
management system in important ways worked very similar across the four 
departments. All departments developed department plans, all but the Culture and 
Sports department with PIs ready for assessment. All departments reported on PIs 
monthly and tertiary, in accordance with the procedure. decided by the CEO.  
Furthermore, the mechanism for transferring of over- and under-consumption of 
funds worked according to the CEO’s plan in all departments. All my informants, 
including the managers who got reduced 2000-budgets because of it, confirm that this 
mechanism worked well. The Financial Officer said,  
In case of deviations from budget, the reasons for it shall be discussed. We’ll 
neither reward nor punish the departments economically if the deviations are due 
to things they have no control over. There is surprisingly little discussion over 
which is which, considering the large sums involved (interview).  
The substantial similarities apart, we observed at least four quite substantial 
differences in management control practices in this period. The first relates to the 
number of PIs used. The Technical department, with 26, had many more than the 
others; nine (Work and employment and Byskogen) and five (Culture and sports). 
The second is the kinds of PIs used. Byskogen School stands out, in being the 
only department to use social tests in this period, and the only one not to make use of 
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outcome dials. This means that overall, very few social tests were used. All 
departments taken together, only 3 out of 54 PIs were social tests; the rest 
instrumental. Note that all four departments identified plenty of structural PIs, 
however. The Work and Employment basically used structural dials only, while 
Byskogen School used both structural dials and structural tin openers. A notable 
change from the first period is that the Technical department started using structural 
PIs, not only outcome. 
A third difference in management control practice was the role of the 
department staff in the process leading to the department plans. There were differences 
between the department in both the breadth and depth of the inclusiveness of 
departmental staff in the development of the department plans. 
Finally, the use of manager contracts varied. Only two of the managers signed 
manager contracts in this period. The principal of Byskogen and the manager of the 
Culture and Sports department did not, however for quite different reasons. The first 
did not sign for “political” reasons; the latter because she forgot to.   
In terms of strategic management, all departments followed the procedures 
prescribed by the CEO, in that they all include the three municipality-wide PIs for 
work environment in their department plans. 
As for learning behaviour, all four departments had arguably been brought 
into more active intrusiveness modes during the course of this second period. The 
above-mentioned substantial differences in the use of PIs aside, all departments by 
now identified a number of PIs in their department plans. This scanning  provided the 
departments with regular feedback, as performance on the PIs were to be reported 
regularly. Data was also obtained in the form of the views of users and staff. This was 
channelled through the user and staff surveys and through the extent to which the 
department managers’ had one-to-one conversations with their staff12.  As for 
interpretation behaviour, all four managers had two annual meetings with superiors in 
this period. Once they met with the CEO, to discuss overall departmental performance 
[medarbeidersamtale], and once with a CEO representative - to follow up on the 
results of the user- and staff surveys in particular. 
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4.3 Third Period, 2000-2001 
Mr. Gaustad made several changes to the management system during 2000. The main 
changes can be summarised under the headings of management control, strategic 
management and organisational learning respectively. Sections 4.3.1-4.3.4 will show 
how these changes to the structures and rules for the management system once again 
were improvised somewhat differently across our four departments. Section 4.3.5. 
summarises the observations. 
Management control 
Important changes were made to the director component of management control. 
From 2000, the department managers were required to institutionalise internal 
processes that involved all staff in the development of the annual department plans 
(interview with Mr. Hellnes and Mr. Gulliksen). A second change in the director 
component was the introduction of standard macros for department plans. In this 
macro, one part was for PIs, another for activities explicitly aimed at performing well 
on these indicators. Finally, managers in the so-called “result support groups” 
[resultatsikringsgrupper] (see next paragraph) were to quality-check each others’ drafts 
for department plans (interview with Mrs. Olsen). 
The main change in the detector component was the introduction in the 
beginning of 2000 of so-called “result support groups”. These groups consisted of one 
“process-guide” from the CEO unit and 6-8 department managers from different 
functional sectors13. In total nine such groups were started. These were to meet every 
other month to discuss how the departments performed. At the start of each meeting, 
the group was to go through the monthly performance reports form each department. 
Those managers who were “off track” on any PI were required to explain what she/he 
had done to get back on track. Then the manager would receive help and advice from 
both the advisor from the CEO unit and the other department managers in the group 
(interviews). 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
12 Recall that one of the commune-wide PIs in this period was “the ratio of the department’s employees who 
have a one-to-one employee-conversation [medarbeidersamtale] with the manager”. 
13 For illustrative purposes: In 2000, one result support group consisted of a process leader from the CEO unit and 
the managers of the following six departments: one nursery, one secondary school, the Social care department, 
the Asylum shelter, the Culture school and the HR department (interview with Mrs. Olsen) 
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Two main changes in the effector component were made. First, the CEO unit 
developed standard macros for the manager contracts, in which the ties to PIs in 
department plans were made explicit. This meant that the managers were obliged by 
contract to make efforts to perform well on the PIs. Second, the introduction of the 
above-mentioned cross-departmental “Result support groups” meant that a strong 
informal peer-group review mechanism (Hood 1998) was institutionalised. This 
mechanism would take advantage of the managers’ presumed desire to show their 
peers that they were doing a good job.  
Strategic management 
From 2000 Mr. Gaustad institutionalised a new process with the intent to further 
enhance strategic management in the organisation. Mr. Gaustad wanted all 
departments to agree on two municipality-wide “administrative focus areas” for the 
coming year. This was to be mechanism for enabling the whole administration to focus 
and co-ordinate its efforts. The start of this process would be that all department 
managers systematically involved their employees to bring out any suggestions they 
might have for such “focus areas”. The managers would then bring these suggestions 
to the first of the annual tertiary “manager-meetings”, where each of the 65 department 
managers and the CEO had one vote each. This “manager-meeting” was in turn to 
decide by vote what the focus areas were to be for the following year. The decision 
made in 2000 - for 2001 - was “competence” and “co-operation”; both measures of 
structural organisational efficiency (cf. p.13). 
Subsequent to this, all departments were to identify their own PIs for these 
focus areas, and include them in their department plans. As for the other PIs, the new 
standard for department plans required a section listing activities explicitly aimed at 
performing well on each and every one (interview with the Financial Officer). (See 
macro attached). 
Furthermore, all departments were still required to report monthly on the three 
municipal-wide PIs for work environment (see section 4.2, p.63f) 
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Organisational learning 
Changes were also made with intent to enhance organisational learning in the 
organisation. In terms of scanning behaviour, the CEO institutionalised an 
arrangement called “public feedback reports” [meldingsordningen] from 2000. The 
general public was urged to give the municipality reports about their satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction concerning any aspect of services provided. Forms for this purpose was 
sent to the inhabitants by mail once a year and made available in all municipal offices 
and on the internet. Once such a form received by the municipality, either by hand, 
mail or electronically, it was to distributed swiftly to the department responsible for 
the service in question. Within 14 days of submittal, the complainer was to be 
contacted with notice of how the municipality had dealt with his or her report 
(interview with Mr. Gulliksen). 
 The above-mentioned introduction of the “result support groups” did not only 
provide a new detector/effector component of management control; it was also 
intended to enhance interpretation behaviour in the organisation. The CEO wanted 
the department managers to draw on each other to better interpret data received from 
all kinds of PIs, not least the results from social tests like user- and staff surveys.   
4.3.1 Third Period, 2000-2001, the Technical department 
In terms of management control practices, Mr. Gulliksen did everything according to 
the CEO’s plan: He included all his employees in the development of the department 
plan for 2001, identified in it PIs for the “administrative focus areas”, participated in 
the “result support groups”, reported monthly and tertiary, and signed the revised 
manager contract.  
In planning 2001 we went further down in the organisation than ever before, Mr. 
Gulliksen said. All my 90 employees participated. I let them work in groups, and 
asked them to make suggestions for concrete objectives. (…) We did some work to 
include staff in planning for 2000 as well, but not like this (interview). 
Including the three municipality-wide PIs, the 2001 department plan from the 
Technical department had in total 40 non-financial PIs.  
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• 25 were outcome dials (e.g. reduce by 15% the amount of pesticides used in 
public parks) 
• one was a procedural dial (compliance with environmental standards in 60% of 
all projects ),  
• six were structural dials (e.g. all employees shall complete a conflict handling-
course), and  
• eight were structural tin openers (e.g.20% increase in job satisfaction on 2001 
work climate survey [a social test]). 
• Eight of the 40 PIs were social tests; 32 were instrumental.  
For 2000 the Technical department had an over-consumption of funds relative to 
budget of NOK 773.223. Of this, NOK 569.223 was transferred to the 2001 budget. 
The reduction in transfer was due to “unforeseen administrative changes” (2000 
Annual report, p.66)14.  
 In terms of strategic management practice, the department plan for 2001 
included the three municipality-wide PIs for work environment and four PIs with 
direct reference to the “administrative focus areas”. The plan listed a range of 
“Efforts” linked to each of these PIs. The above mentioned “20% increase in job 
satisfaction on 2001 work climate survey” was one such  PI – related to the focus area 
“Co-operation”. Ten “Efforts” were in turned listed with reference to this PI. Examples 
were “Make an internal “who’s who”-folder with pictures of all employees in all sub-
groups” and “Arrange a joint Christmas party [julebord] for all sub-groups”. 
As for learning behaviour, Mr. Gulliksen was the only department manager 
interviewed who emphasised the importance of  the “public reports”-arrangement as a  
source of feedback. As a matter of fact, about 50% of all reports issued were related to 
services provided by the Technical department. The sheer amount of reports that 
complained about bad road condition prompted the municipality’s politicians 
[kommunestyret] to grant the department with NOK 6,5 millions extra for 2001, ear-
marked for road maintenance (interview with Mr. Gulliksen). 
                                                          
14 The Financial Officer, Mr. Hellnes, explained the phenomenon of “unforeseen changes”: “If under- or over-consumption of 
funds are due to things the department manager could not have foreseen at the time of planning, we will neither reward nor  
punish him for it. (…) There has in fact been little discussion over this, but some in the schools. A head teacher [with an 
over-consumption] might say: ‘But in my school we have so difficult pupils, we have four autistic’ and so on. Then we say: 
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In Mr. Gulliksen’s experience, the “result support groups”  were helpful for both 
scanning and interpretation activities. Related to scanning, he had used the groups “to 
get ideas for new PIs and to make the existing PIs as concrete as possible” (interview).  
4.3.2 Third Period, 2000-2001, the Work and Employment department 
In terms of management control practice, Mr. Auby too did everything according to 
the CEO’s plan. He included all his sub-units and employees in the development of the 
department plan for 2001, participated in the “result support groups”, issued 
performance reports monthly and tertiary, and signed the revised manager contract.. 
Including the three municipality-wide PIs, the 2001 department plan from the Work 
and Employment department had in total 12 non-financial PIs15,  
• one was an outcome tin-opener (25% of all benefit claimants shall be 
transferred to paid occupation or the national insurance scheme),  
• ten were structural dials (e.g. institutionalise meetings between the. department 
and the municipality’s  Social benefits department ), and  
• one was a structural tin-opener (percentage sick-leave).  
• All 12 PIs were instrumental tests.  
For 2000 the Work and Employment department had an over-consumption of funds 
relative to budget of NOK 350.732. This was not transferred to the 2001 budget. 
According to the Financial Officer, this was a reward for the department’s hard work 
and record rate this year in getting benefit claimants into paid occupation, and thereby 
saving the municipality NOK 5m in benefit payments (interview). This shows that the 
budget-transferring mechanism was not operated purely as a dial. Some interpretation 
was used. But note that over the whole period studied, 1996-2001, this is one of only 
two exceptions from the “direct transfer”-rule. 
Mr. Auby seemed to perceive of his manager contract as binding. He explained 
how his contract gave two options in the case of major deviations between the planned 
and actual performance on key PIs. If the deviations could be explained by his poor 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
‘You knew about those four autistic pupils all along, so you’ll have to struggle with your over-consumption’. That’s not 
‘unforeseen changes’; that’s over-consumption within a normal situation [‘normal driftssituasjon’]” (interview). 
15 In addition, all of the Work and Employment department’s 11 sub-groups developed PIs that measured their contributions 
to the achievement of the department’s goals. The workings of these sub-groups far escape the scope of this thesis, however. 
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performance, he would either be fired, or he would be repositioned within the 
municipality, to some non-executive position (interview). This “if” was however an 
important qualification. Mr. Auby explained what would happen in the case of major 
deviations from the plan, e.g. on the above mentioned outcome tin-opener “25% of all 
benefit claimants shall be transferred to paid occupation or the national insurance 
scheme” 
We [the CEO and himself] would obviously have to negotiate. If the poor 
performance was not due to things out of my control, I’d be in trouble. But what 
counts as relevant external factors is not specified [in his contract]. (…) And that 
can be many things. Changes in the rules about benefit claims, (…) the mood of the 
labour market, (…) sudden changes in the number of immigrants (…) (interview). 
This serves to illustrate the difference between PIs that are tin openers and dials. As 
discussed earlier, to make out the implications of performance on tin opener dials, 
negotiation and interpretation is needed. This aspect of the director component of 
management control greatly influenced the effector-potential of the manager contract. 
The contract did indeed compel Mr. Auby to perform well on his PIs, but it was not 
perceived as a direct threat to his job. 
 Mr. Auby explained the absence of social tests with practical difficulties, 
specific for his department. To illustrate, Mr. Auby, gave two examples. First, the 
department runs a kindergarten for foreign-language children. The  language shortages 
of these children’s parents means that the questions the department can ask them in 
interviews or surveys are bound to be very simplistic. I.e., little valuable data can be 
obtained from such scanning activities. A second difficulty relates to clients with 
psychiatric problems. To find out whether such clients are satisfied with the 
performance of the department is very difficult, because they are often too shameful 
about their problems to even want to register as clients, not to mention to give the 
department feedback about its performance (interview). 
In terms of strategic management practice, the department plan for 2001 included 
the three municipality-wide PIs for work environment as well as PIs with direct 
reference to the “administrative focus areas”. The plan listed a range of “efforts” 
linked to each of these PIs. One PI linked to the “focus area” “Competence”  was that 
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sub-group leaders were to increase their formal competence – measured in credits. An 
“Effort” with reference to this PI was to reorganise one of the groups so that its 
manager could take time off for studies without having to hire a substitute .  
Mr. Auby explained his dedication to these common “focus areas” with the 
democratic process that had lead to them: 
In the manager meeting I am like an ambassador for my department, Mr. Auby 
explained. I fight for the focus areas my employees want. (…) This year they were 
fairly happy with what I came home with -  though we did have some other 
suggestions as well. One of our suggestions only received my vote [in the manager 
meeting], but it’s a democratic process, so that’s alright (interview). 
Related to learning behaviour, Mr. Auby conformed to the procedures laid down by 
the CEO. As illustrated by the quote above, Mr. Auby did not feel overrun by the CEO 
in their annual “interpreting”-discussions about the department’s performance. Asked 
whether he felt that the result support groups provided useful advice, and whether 
praise from the others managers was an important source of motivation, his answer 
was this: 
Yes, especially on [common] things like sick leave. But generally, the [other] 
managers get virtually no insight into the conglomerate I’m running here. It’s not 
like I’m running a school. If I wanted, I could have easily fooled them about [the 
department’s performance on] the PIs [laughs]” (interview).  
(recall that the Work and Employment department was made up of 11 sub-groups). 
4.3.3 Third Period, 2000-2001, The Culture and Sports department 
Mrs. Wold included all her administrative employees in the development of the 
department plan for 2001, participated in the “result support groups” and  reported 
monthly and tertiary; everything according to the CEO’s plan. Unlike the other 
managers though, she had still not signed a manager contract with the CEO. “I do have 
a contract”, she said, “but I don’t think I’ve signed it yet” (interview). 
Including the three municipality-wide PIs, the 2001 department plan from the 
Culture and Sports department had in total eight non-financial PIs. 
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• one was an outcome dial (30% of all disabled in the municipality shall take part 
in some cultural event arranged by the department),  
• one was an outcome tin-opener (a doubling of the number of sports 
organisations in the municipality that have included disabled in their activities) 
• five were structural dials (e.g. all employees in the administration have 
competence in web-publishing of information), and  
• two were structural tin-openers (e.g. 1,6 applications per local cultural 
organisations processed).  
• All eight PIs were instrumental tests.  
For 2000 the Culture and Sports department had an under-consumption of funds 
relative to budget of NOK 490.220. This was transferred to the 2001 budget. 
In terms of strategic management practice, the Culture and Sports department 
plan for 2001 included the three municipality-wide PIs for work environment as well 
as four PIs with direct reference to the “administrative focus areas”. The plan listed a 
range of “efforts” linked to each of these PIs. One PI linked to the “focus area” 
“Competence”  was that sub-group leaders were to increase their formal competence – 
measured in credits. An “Effort” with reference to this PI was to reorganise one of the 
groups so that its manager could take time off for studies without having to hire a 
substitute . 
Like Mr. Auby, Mrs. Wold was happy with the way the “administrative focus 
areas” were decided, and she did identify PIs for them in her department’s department 
plan, even though she did not vote for them in the manager meeting.  
All managers fight for their suggestions, she said, and some win while others lose… 
The focus areas that were decided now were not much fun to bring back to my 
department; my employees thought they were very dull. What they wanted were 
International orientation and Culture (interview). 
Asked why she wants to identify e.g. PIs within the “municipality-wide focus 
areas” and perform well on them, Mrs. Wold said, 
I guess it’s a result of a communicative effort from Einar [the CEO, Mr. Einar 
Gaustad]. Because it’s not that I have a personal interest in it. I think at some point 
my intellect just absorbed that “this is important”. And that must be because of  
79 
Performance Management and Organisational Intelligence 
how the system has been communicated in the organisation. So I guess the answer 
is that I just believe in it (laughs). I actually do. (interview) 
 Related to learning behaviour Mrs. Wold conformed to the procedures laid 
down by the CEO. 
4.3.4 Third Period, 2000-2001, Byskogen primary school 
Mrs. Olsen included all her teachers in the development of the department plan for 
2001, issued performance reports monthly and tertiary, and finally signed the revised 
manager contract; everything according to the CEO’s plan for management control 
practices.  
Including the three municipality-wide PIs, the 2001 department plan from Byskogen 
primary school had in total 11 non-financial PIs.  
• one was an outcome dial (45% of all pupils use IT for school work regularly),  
• 7 were structural dials (e.g. achieve 3,2 points on a national quality index for 
adaptation of school equipment for teaching of challenged pupils), and  
• 3 were structural tin openers (e.g. 90% of all pupils shall feel comfortable at 
school [a social test]).  
• Two of the 11 PIs were social tests, the rest instrumental.  
For 2000 the Byskogen had an under-consumption of funds relative to budget of 
NOK 238.708. This was transferred to the 2001 budget. 
As for strategic management, Mrs. Olsen too followed the procedures 
prescribed by the CEO. In addition to the “old” municipality-wide PIs for work 
environment, her 2001 department plan included three PIs with direct reference to the 
agreed “administrative focus areas”. Two of several “Efforts” that were listed with 
reference to the “focus area” “Competence” was “Customise the teachers’ educational 
needs through one-to-one employee-conversations, and customise education for ten 
teachers” and “Let ten teachers work for a period of time at another school”.  
 Turning now to organisational learning, two changes were made by the CEO 
in 2000, specifically aimed at enhancing scanning behaviour in the 25 schools. Mrs. 
Olsen changed Byskogen’s scanning behaviour accordingly. The first change was that 
each school was now to conduct biannual tests of reading skills and surveys of pupil 
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well-being [elevtrivsel] (interview with Mrs. Olsen). The results of these were reported 
to the CEO unit. Furthermore, the schools were asked to compare their performance on 
these PIs with that of schools in the neighbouring municipalities. 
As for interpretation behaviour, Mrs. Olsen appeared very satisfied with the 
interpretation-aspect of the “result support groups”. She described her experience as 
follows: 
The first post [in the meeting] is the forthcoming monthly performance reports. 
We go through those quickly, “are you on course [on the PIs] or not”. And if you 
say “no”, we ask, “do you need help? Is there anything we can do?”. It can be 
high sick leave (…) or anything. So you see, we lift this manager’s problem in and 
discuss it together. And if the help from the managers in the group is not enough, 
the department writes in its monthly report to the CEO that it needs support. (…) 
This way we [the department managers] get insight about each other’s 
departments, (…) and we get respect for each other’s work. This makes it easier to 
make contact informally as well - whenever we need help with something 
(interview) 
The CEO made one more intervention in this period to further enhance the 
interpretation efforts of the schools in the municipality.  
Some of these objectives [PIs] obviously spur reflection, more than anything else. 
So I had to find a way to make them [school managers/heads] sit down and think 
“what does this mean”. That’s why I’ve made the schools send letters to all 
parents, describing the results [of the user surveys] and stating “this is what we 
intend  to do about it”. That way you build up an expectation among the parents; 
an expectation they [the school managers]  won’t dare to challenge (interview with 
Mr. Gaustad). 
4.4 Summary of all observations 
Table 4 below provides a systematised summary of the observations from this third 
period of the change experience. The far left column lists what I see as the key aspects 
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of management accounting practices, sorted under the headings of management 
control, strategic management and organisational learning.  
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Table 4: Summary of observations, 2001 
 
ASPECTS OF MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING PRACTICE  TECHNICAL DEPARTMENT WORK AND 
EMPLOYMENT 
DEPARTMENT 
CULTURE AND 
SPORTS DEPARTMENT
BYSKOGEN SCHOOL 
(1) Management Control Practice 
Director 1: Development of department plans All departments developed plans according to the prescribed routines. I.e. all plans contained a substantial 
number of PIs with “Efforts” directly linked to them. All plans were results of processes which included 
departmental staff. 
Director 2: Number of PIs in department plans, 2001 Many (40) Relatively few (12) Few (8) Relatively few (11) 
Director 3: How PIs were measured, 2001 Social (8) as well as instrumental 
tests (32) 
Instrumental tests 
only 
Instrumental tests only Social as well as 
instrumental tests 
Director 3: What PIs measured and how they were used, 
2001 (cf. typology on p.15) 
Many outcome dials, some structural 
dials and structural tin-openers 
One outcome tin-
opener, many 
structural dials 
Structural dials and 
structural tin-openers 
Structural dials and 
structural tin-openers 
Detector 1 and Effector 2: Reporting routines All departments issued monthly and tertiary performance reports to the CEO. All used the same format; 
with columns in the reports for information about what the manager had done to get back on track - in the 
case of  deviations from plan on any PI 
Detector 2 and Effector 2: Participation in result support 
groups 
The managers of all departments participated in and the cross-departmental result support groups 
Effector 3: Manager contract with links to PIs in department 
plans 
Signed Signed Not signed, but a 
contract existed. 
Signed 
Effector 4: The operation of the budget transferring 
mechanism 
By 2001, the mechanism worked as intended in all departments. Used as tin opener in the Work and 
employment and the Technical department, and as a dial in Culture and sports and Byskogen. 
Effector 5:Annual meetings between department manager 
and CEO to discuss departmental performance and revise the 
manager contract 
Took place in all departments 
(2) Strategic Management Practice 
S.M. 1: The three municipal-wide PIs for  work environment All departments included these PIs in their department plans and reported on in them in the ordinary 
monthly performance reports to the CEO 
S.M. 2: The two “administrative focus areas” All departments arranged internal processes to bring out suggestions for focus areas. All managers 
participated in the democratic manager meetings that decided. All departments plans contained customised 
PIs for the two focus areas, and “Efforts” linked to them. All reported on these PIs in the ordinary tertiary 
performance reports to the CEO. 
Continued on next page. 
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Continued from previous page: Table 4: Summary of observations, 2001 
 
MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING PRACTICE  TECHNICAL DEPARTMENT WORK AND 
EMPLOYMENT 
DEPARTMENT 
CULTURE AND 
SPORTS DEPARTMENT
BYSKOGEN SCHOOL 
(3) Learning Behaviour 
Scanning 1: Regularity  The compulsory reporting routines meant that all departments were involved with regular scanning 
activities: Monthly and tertiary performance reports, annual surveys among users and staff. 
Scanning 2: PIs in department plans as data source: Relatively few PIs in the department 
plan included both dials and tin-
openers, instrumental as well as 
social tests, and outcome as well as 
structural measures.  
The relatively few 
PIs were mostly 
dials and 
instrumental tests. 
The few PIs were 
mostly dials and 
instrumental tests. 
Although relatively 
few and mostly 
structural measures, 
the PIs in the 
department plan 
included both dials 
and tin-openers, and  
instrumental as well as 
social tests. 
Scanning 2: Compulsory face-to-face interactions with 
stakeholders and others as data source 
All department managers conducted individual employee conversations with most or all of their staff (cf. 
S.M. 1), they participated in the cross-departmental result support groups (cf. detector 2), and they had two 
annual one-to-one meetings with superiors (cf. effector 5 and interpretation 2)  
Scanning 3: Compulsory user - and staff surveys as data 
sources 
Conducted. Even an additional, more 
specific user survey conducted.  
Conducted Conducted Conducted. Even an 
additional, school-
specific user (pupils) 
survey conducted. 
Scanning 4: The “Public feedback reports” as data source Emphasised as an important source 
of data. Half of all feedback received 
was related to this department. 
Not emphasised Not emphasised Not emphasised 
Scanning 5: Data sources summarised An extremely wide selection of 
sources.  
Quite a few sources, but nonetheless a  
narrow selection compared to Technical and 
Byskogen 
A very wide selection 
of sources 
Interpretation 1: Participation in result support groups All departments participated in the cross-departmental result support groups. All used it to interpret the data 
obtained from the various scanning activities. 
Interpretation 2: Two annual one-to-one meetings with 
superiors. One between the department manager and the 
CEO to discuss overall departmental performance (see 
effector 5 above), and one between the manager and a CEO 
representative -. to discuss the results of the user and staff 
surveys 
Took place in all departments. 
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5 ANALYSIS 
 
 
This chapter revisits the hypothesises put forward in chapter 2 in the light of chapter 
4’s narration of Larvik’s BSC-reform experience. The hypothesises are “put to the 
test”, if you will. Section 5.1 discusses hypothesises 1A-1C, concerning the extent to 
which the reform facilitated the first process of organisational intelligence, 
management control. Section 5.2 discusses strategic management; while section 5.3 
discusses whether the second process of organisational intelligence was facilitated, 
organisational learning. 
5.1 The BSC-reform and Management control 
Recall that hypothesis 1 was that the BSC-reform in Larvik would facilitate 
management control in relation to all four departments studied. Hypothesises 1A-1C 
pertained to the more specific entailments of management control practices across the 
departments: Hypothesis 1A was that in the Technical department, an organisation 
characterised by production technology, we would observe a “close” management 
control practice developing over time (cf. p.28). Hypothesis 1B was that in Byskogen 
school, an  organisation characterised by coping technology, we would observe a 
“prospects-oriented” management control practice developing over time (cf. p.29). 
Finally, hypothesis 1C was that in the Work and employment department and the 
Culture and sports department, organisations characterised by craft technology, we 
would observe a “results-oriented” management control practice developing over time 
(cf. p.30f). The nil-hypothesis was that management control was not facilitated in 
Larvik. What have we found? 
Chapter 4 narrated how over the period 1996-2001, Larvik’s CEO did indeed 
build up a management control system - brick by brick. The differences between the 
1996-1999-period and the situation in 2001, illustrated in Table 4, are astonishing. In 
1999, we could see the fundament for a director component of management control. 
The detector component was weak, however, and the effector component barely 
existed (cf. summary of the first period, p.63). By 2001 all three components had been 
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firmly institutionalised in relation to all four departments studied (cf. Table 4). This 
means that the nil-hypothesis can be firmly rejected, and that hypothesis 1 is 
strengthened. Management control was indeed facilitated by the BSC-reform.  
Whether the more specific hypothesises 1A-1C were supported is however less 
clear. Recall that the question addressed by hypothesises 1A-1C was this: “What 
management control practices do we expect to observe developing over time - in the 
relation between upper management and departments characterised by different forms 
of organisational technologies?” (cf. p.27). Macintosh’s thesis was that as 
organisations seek organisational structures that are congruent with their technologies, 
we should also expect them to seek a congruence between technologies and their 
management control systems (Macintosh 1985:246-255, 1994:112-113).  
 Have we observed a “close” management control practice developing in the 
relation between upper management and the Technical department? And likewise - a 
“prospects-oriented” practise in relation to Byskogen school, and a “results-oriented” 
practice in Work and employment and Culture and Sports? 
 A first glance at Table 4 (p.83f) probably catches more similarities than 
differences in management control practices across the departments. But a closer look 
reveals that important differences in fact remained, most notably on the director 
component of management control. Therefore, I will revisit hypothesises 1A-1C only 
after I have summarised my observations under the following two headings: “A Big 
Picture of Similarities”, and “The Devil is in the Details: A Nuanced Picture of 
Differences”. 
 
A Big Picture of Similarities 
We recall (from pp. 27-32 above) that the frequency in performance reporting and the 
pattern of participation in setting the department’s targets/PIs were two central 
features in distinguishing the management control practices (Macintosh 1994:114f). In 
the case of Larvik, we have seen how these differences were eradicated by the CEO’s 
requirements and interventions. From the very beginning, all departments were obliged 
to follow the same reporting routines, first tertiary, then both tertiary and monthly.  
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The same goes for the patterns of participation in target-setting. In the first 
period, none of the department managers were especially influential in the target-
setting process. As Mr. Gulliksen, manager of the Technical department said, 
In the beginning I guess most of the targets [i.e. the PIs] were decided by the CEO, 
and then tried out in the departments subsequently. But with time we [the 
department managers] have been included more and more. We have looked at the 
targets and compared them with what we can achieve. And then we have 
discussions. And the CEO is very good at that, I think. Sometimes I win, and 
sometimes he wins (interview). 
At the time of the third period of the change experience, the CEO largely stayed out of 
the target-setting process. The departments were left much to themselves. The author 
asked Mr. Auby, manager of the Work and Employment department about what sort of 
discussions he had with the CEO in the process of the setting PIs: 
I set the targets myself, Mr. Auby  answered. And I haven’t heard any complaints 
yet. He [the CEO] tells us if he thinks we’re not ambitious enough. ‘Hot dog-
targets’ [‘pølsemål’] he says, if he thinks we set targets that are too low. That 
means ‘you’re there already’. (...) But I haven’t heard him complaining about my 
PIs, and as long as I don’t hear anything, I assume everything’s ok by him. 
(interview) 
 A second aspect of the patterns of participation is the inclusion or exclusion of 
front-line staff in deciding the department’s targets/PIs. In the first period, and to some 
extent in the second, the CEO allowed for substantial differences in departmental 
improvisations. But from 2000, all department managers were obliged to include all 
members of staff. As Mr. Gulliksen, manager of the Technical department said, 
In planning 2001 we went further down in the organisation than ever before. All my 
90 employees participated. I let them work in groups, and asked them to make 
suggestions for concrete objectives. (…) We did some work to include staff in 1999 
as well, planning for 2000, but not like this (interview). 
In short, and as illustrated by Table 4, by the end of the 1996-2001 change 
experience, the management control system in many ways was practised virtually 
identically across the four departments studied. Chapter 4’s division of the Larvik 
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change experience into three periods illustrated how large, seemingly overwhelming 
differences across the departments’ improvisations of the BSC-reform over time were 
aligned by the CEO’s steady stream of innovative interventions and communicative 
efforts. 
In the detector and effector components of management control, the  
departments were literally aligned by 2001. An example was the aligned reporting 
routines mentioned above. Many of the differences in the director component had also 
disappeared over the five-year time period, like the patterns of participation in target-
setting. To be specific, in the director component of management control, by the end 
of the change experience studied all departments not only developed department plans; 
all plans now had the same format (with PIs and “Efforts” linked to them); they all 
included a substantial number of PIs; and all plans were the results of broad and deep 
bottom-up processes. Secondly, the detector component worked identically across the 
department, in terms of reporting routines and all managers’ participation in the result 
support groups. And finally, the effector component was also largely aligned, as the 
budget-transferring-mechanism worked as planned in all departments, and the 
differences in the use of manager contracts were decreased from the previous period.  
Accounting for the similarities 
What can account for these similarities? Inversely, the author asked the CEO, Mr. 
Gaustad, why there were some differences in the departments’ practising of the 
management accounting system. “It’s a matter of management”, he answered. In other 
words, the CEO argued that the observed differences were due to the wills and skills of 
the department managers, nothing else. And to a certain extent the narration of the 
change experience proved him right. Over (in Mr. Gaustad’s own words:) “five years 
of trial and error”, the CEO’s steady stream of innovative interventions, in concert 
with his extensive communicative efforts in fact aligned large, seemingly 
overwhelming differences across the departments’ improvisations. These differences 
were obviously, as Mr. Gaustad put it, “matters of management”.  
How did Mr. Gaustad succeed in aligning these differences? Through 
managerial innovations, he built up robust carrot&stick-mechanisms. Examples are the 
use of manager contracts linked to the PIs in the department plans and the introduction 
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of the peer-group review of the cross-departmental “result support groups”. The 
department managers had no choice but to follow these procedures. Hence, at least in 
relation to management control, the Larvik change experience was perhaps not as 
characterised by “interpretation” (cf. p.54) as the author first thought.  
An illustrating quote was the CEO’s answer to the author’s question of why the 
departments make budgets with PIs and report faithfully on deviations:  
You know, the managers sort of weigh the pain. What hurts more; doing it or not 
doing it? (interview) 
Probably just as important to understand the similarities is the “softer” 
explanation of acceptance and good-will. By including the department managers from 
day one, through institutionalised arrangements like the one-man-one-vote “manager 
meetings”, and largely leave up to them and their employees the setting of the 
department’s PIs, Mr. Gaustad gained the acceptance,  good-will and “ownership” 
(Carter et.al. 1992:31-33) necessary to make the departments “embrace” the new 
management control practices. I will let two quotes from the department managers 
illustrate this point:  
Mr. Gulliksen, manager of the technical department, said, 
I guess in the beginning most of the PIs were decided centrally, and then 
subsequently tried out in the department. Then after a while we [the department 
manager and the CEO] started looking at the PIs together and discussing what we 
realistically could perform. So now we have discussions. And the CEO is very good 
at that, I think. Sometimes he wins, sometimes I  win. I really appreciate that, that 
we can have a discussion (interview) 
A good illustration of the enthusiasm and ownership for the management system, 
an enthusiasm that seemed to be shared by all the managers interviewed in Larvik, is a 
quote from Mrs. Wold, the manager of the Culture and Sports department. Asked why 
she wants to identify e.g. customised PIs within the “municipality-wide focus areas” 
and perform well on them, Mrs. Wold said, 
I guess it’s a result of a communicative effort from Einar [the CEO, Mr. Einar 
Gaustad]. Because it’s not that I have a personal interest in it. I think at some point 
my intellect absorbed that this is important. And that must be because of  how the 
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system has been communicated in the organisation. So I guess the answer is that I 
just believe in it (laughs). I actually do. (interview) 
 
The Devil is in the Details: A Nuanced Picture of Differences 
The similarities in management control practices are hence substantial. This does not 
mean that all hope is lost for hypothesises 1A-1C, though. According to Macintosh, 
important features the detail of Upon taking a closer look, we have however indeed 
observed how far from all differences could be aligned by the CEO’s efforts. 
Substantial differences remained on the crucial director component of management 
control. Related to Macintosh’s theory, differences remained on the detail of the 
information provided by the PI-system and what the PI-system was used for 
(Macintosh 1994:114-115). 
As for detail, the number of PIs in the department plans still varied across the 
department in 2001. Though all four departments by now identified a substantial 
number of PIs, differences remained. As in the two previous periods, the Technical 
department used many more PIs than the other three. All the three periods taken 
together, the Technical department (68) stands out from the Work and Employment 
department (32) and Byskogen School (28), which again stand out from the Culture 
and Sports department (19).  
When it comes to the second aspect, what use the CEO could make of the data 
from the PI-system, the following three features are relevant: How the PIs were 
measured, what the PIs measured, and whether they were dials or tin-openers (the 
latter is the “how used”-question from Figure 1, on p.15). 
As for how measured, only two of the departments, the Technical department 
and Byskogen School made use of social tests as PIs in their 2001 department plans. 
Note that overall, there were still very few social tests being used. All departments 
taken together, only 10 out of 71 PIs were social tests in the third period, 61 were 
instrumental. Hence, the three periods taken together, only 17 out of 156 PIs were 
social tests.  
Differences also remained on the questions What do the PIs measure and How 
are the PIs used. Related to the 3*2 PI-typology, the big picture was that only the 
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Technical department identified outcome dials in the third period, no one identified 
procedural PIs, while all four departments identified a vast number structural PIs. The 
Work and Employment basically used structural dials only, while the Culture and 
Sports department and Byskogen School used both structural dials and structural tin 
openers.  
One final observation, taking all three PI-“questions” into account, is that only 
two departments, the Technical department and Byskogen School, used a wide range 
of all the possible PIs. Both departments used both instrumental and social tests and 
they both made use of both dials and tin openers through all three periods studied. 
(Remember however, that the Technical department made an even broader selection, 
in that they used outcome as well as structural PIs). The other two departments used 
only instrumental test, and basically exclusively dials. 
 
Hypothesises 1A-1C Revisited 
Where does this leave us in relation to hypothesis 1A-1C? Having summed up both 
similarities and differences in the departments’ practices, have we observed a “close” 
management control practice developing in the relation between upper management 
and the Technical department? And likewise - a “prospects-oriented” practise in 
relation to Byskogen school, and a “results-oriented” practice in Work and 
employment and Culture and Sports? 
I will firmly underline the importance of  the different practises on the director 
component. The director component of management control provides the foundation 
for the detector and effector components. In other words, the fact that the PIs identified 
in the department plans in turn were the ones the departments reported on and hence 
were controlled on the basis of, underlines the importance of these differences.  
Hypothesis 1A Revisited 
On this basis, my understanding is that a “close” management control practice did 
indeed develop in the relation between upper management (the CEO) and the 
Technical department. Hypothesis 1A was hence firmly strengthened by the Larvik 
change experience. Contrary to the expectations (cf. p.28f. and Macintosh 1994:115), 
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we have seen how upper management left the target-setting much to the department 
itself, but most other expectations held water. The PIs were many and detailed, 
focusing on outcomes as well as structural output; and, as was the case of the other 
three departments, reports were frequent. Moreover, many PIs were dials. In effect, we 
conclude that a “close” management practice did emerge; a system for close measuring 
and monitoring of outputs as well as outcome. 
Hypothesis 1B Revisited 
Hypothesis 1B was also strengthened by the Larvik experience, only perhaps not as 
firmly as hypothesis 1A. Contrary to the expectations (cf. p.29 and Macintosh 
1994:117), we have seen how Byskogen’s performance reporting was frequent and 
systematic. But again, most expectations proved to be confirmed. The target-setting 
was left much to Byskogen’s  manager/head teacher and her employees. And targets 
were – again, quite right -  not detailed, rather they were relatively few throughout the 
reform period. Moreover, virtually all PIs used by Byskogen were measures of 
structural effectiveness, and most were tin openers. Central among these structural tin-
openers were social tests, like staff and both general and specific user surveys. What 
sort of control system is this?  
We recall that Byskogen stood out from the rest by using a wide range of all the 
possible PIs. Both instrumental and social tests were made use of, as were both dials 
and tin openers16. Both the CEO, Mr. Gaustad and the Financial Officer, Mr. Hellnes 
emphasised the importance of this breadth in PIs. The author asked Mr. Gaustad what 
managerial use he could make of the information from e.g. a user survey from a 
school. 
It’s clearly a diffuse measure of the head and the school’s performance, Mr. 
Gaustad agreed. Many things may influence on a user survey. But the thing is, if 
one school performs worse than the others on such a test year after year, we have 
reason to suspect that the head is not doing a good job. And remember that in 
addition to user satisfaction we have measures of staff satisfaction and resource 
                                                          
16 An example of a dial was “achieve 3,2 points on a national quality index for adaptation of school equipment  
for teaching of challenged pupils”; an example of a tin-opener was “90% of all pupils shall feel comfortable at 
school” (a social test from the user survey) (Both examples from Byskogen’s 2001 department plan). 
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consumption. (...) And hopefully we’ll get indicators of pupil performances soon as 
well. (...) The thing is, when you put those four “diffuse” indicators together, you 
get a pretty good idea of what goes on in that school. (...) And then you can start 
figuring out how to make corrections. (interview). 
I interpret this account of Byskogen’s experience conform Macintosh’s 
expectation: The department’s PI-system could be used by the CEO less as a tool for 
close measuring and monitoring than as a tool for evaluation, planning and estimation 
of future prospects. 
Hypothesis 1C Revisited 
Hypothesis 1C was however not strengthened by the Larvik experience. As expected 
(cf. p.32 and Macintosh 1994:116), in both the Work and employment department and 
the Culture and sports department, department managers and staff were influential in 
the target-setting process. But as was the case in the other two departments studied as 
well. Also conforming to the expectations is the fact that neither departments issued 
detailed performance reports. In fact, both departments had relatively few PIs, Culture 
and sports fewest of all four departments studied.  
The reason why hypothesis 1C is still not supported, is the fact that neither of 
the two departments used “simple PIs, involving instrumental tests focusing on 
outcomes” (p.31 above). On the contrary, both Work and employment and  Culture 
and sports used virtually structural PIs only. Work and employment basically used 
structural dials only, while the Culture and Sports used both structural dials and 
structural tin openers. The only department to use many outcome PIs was the 
Technical department. 
This does however not mean that management control was not facilitated in the 
case of these two latter departments. Recall that hypothesis 1 has already been 
confirmed.  
But to what extent this finding falsifies or qualifies Macintosh’s theory would 
require a lengthy discussion of whether or not Work and employment and  Culture and 
sports were examples of organisations with “craft” technologies. Such a discussion 
escapes the scope of this thesis. Suffice to note that Macintosh did help us to predict 
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and make sense of a substantial part of the management control practices developing 
in Larvik, in that hypothesises 1A and 1B were indeed strengthened. 
 
   
5.2 The BSC-reform and Strategic management 
Recall from page 32f that hypothesis 2 was that the BSC-reform had facilitated 
strategic management in Larvik. I.e., over the period studied, 1996-2001, we expected 
to find a hierarchy of objectives emerging in relation to all the four departments 
studied. The nil-hypothesis was that a hierarchy of objectives did not emerge.  
 What we have observed is that the management accounting system over time 
did indeed become a strong tool for strategic management in Larvik; a tool that 
worked practically identically across the four departments studied. The tool was 
institutionalised in two bulks, both in the last half of the change experience. In 1999 
the CEO built three measures of work environment into the system; the ratio of the 
department’s employees who have a one-to-one employee-conversation with the 
manager, total sick leave; and the number of accepted suggestions from the employees 
for department improvement (cf. p.65f). Since then, all four departments studied 
faithfully constructed PIs for these measures, included them in their department plans 
and reported on them in their monthly and tertiary performance reports to the CEO.  
In 2000 the “administrative focus areas”-arrangement was introduced, in an 
effort made by the CEO to further advance strategic management (cf. p.73f). This 
intervention too was embraced by the department studied. All four departments’ plans 
for 2001 included customised PIs with direct reference to the agreed “administrative 
focus areas”. And moreover, all plans had several “Efforts” listed with reference to 
these PIs.  
My conclusion is hence that hypothesis 2 is strengthened, and that the nil-
hypothesis is rejected. A hierarchy of objectives did emerge, in that PIs for 
municipality-wide objectives were developed in all departments; incorporated into the 
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management accounting system; and practised alongside the department-specific PIs. 
The BSC-reform did indeed facilitate strategic management i Larvik. 
Two “footnotes” must be mentioned, however, before we move on from 
hypothesis 2. The first concerns an implication of the way in which the focus areas 
were decided in Larvik. Recall that when asked to explain their willingness to dedicate 
efforts to these focus areas, several of the managers emphasised the inclusive and 
democratic process that preceded them (cf. p.78,79). Whether “focus areas” dictated 
from above, either from the CEO or the politicians- would have been embraced in the 
same way remains unanswered.  
The second “footnote” is the fact that what unites all the objectives successfully 
“strategically managed” in Larvik is that they were all measures of what Scott (1992) 
calls “structural effectiveness” (cf. p.14). This can be interpreted to indicate that there 
is in fact a sharp limit to what objectives you can make a large, diversified 
organisation – like e.g. a municipality – unite behind. Structural measures like work 
environment, competence and co-operation are perhaps the smallest common 
denominators. A quote from Mrs. Wold, manager of the Culture and sports department 
illustrates this point: 
Last year we [her department] fought for “Youth” as administrative focus area for 
2001. That would have been great for us, but I’m not sure how the elderly homes 
would have dealt with  that. (interview) 
 Together these two “footnotes” indicate that the ability of the Balanced 
Scorecard to “translate strategy into action” in a decentralised organisation like a 
municipality is dependant upon at least two things; the design of the process and 
the strategies themselves. 
  
5.3 The BSC-reform and Organisational learning 
Recall hypothesis 3 from page 45: Over the period 1996-2000, the BSC reform would 
partly help, partly force all four departments studied into a more active intrusiveness 
mode. What this implied in terms of actual learning behaviour was contingent upon 
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their assumptions about their environments. Byskogen school and the Culture and 
Sports department, the departments assumed to perceive unanalysable environments, 
were hypothesised to have moved from a starting-point in an “undirected viewing” 
learning to an “enacting” mode. The Technical department, assumed to perceive an 
analysable environment, was hypothesised to have moved from a “conditioned 
viewing” to a “discovering” learning mode. The nil-hypothesis was that the reform had 
not brought the departments into a more active intrusiveness mode. What have we 
found? 
Chapter 4 narrated how all four departments studied were helped-slash-moved 
into a significantly more active intrusiveness mode by the BSC-reform. Arguably, the 
differences between the first and the third period are staggering. In 1996-1999, 
virtually no scanning activities took place, and no arenas or processes for 
interpretation had been institutionalised. Table 4 shows an entirely different picture. 
By 2001 a wide range of regular scanning activities took place. This implied that all 
department managers regularly obtained data/feedback from numerous sources: From 
monthly and tertiary assessments against PIs in department plans, bi-annual individual 
meetings with superiors, meetings with other department managers every other month, 
the public feedback reports and annual surveys among staff and users.  
Two important arenas had been institutionalised by the CEO to assist the 
department managers in interpreting this vast amount of feedback. One was individual 
meetings between department managers and superiors. By 2001, all managers had two 
annual one-to-one meetings with superiors: one between the department manager and 
the CEO to discuss overall departmental performance and one between the manager 
and a CEO representative - to discuss the results of the user and staff surveys in 
particular. As described in section 4.2.4 above, Mrs. Olsen, manager/head teacher of 
Byskogen primary school, emphasised the importance of these meetings. 
In the case of a poor result on any of the surveys, we discuss what efforts I should 
be thinking about making. (…) But in these discussions, it is me as a manager 
who’s responsible for drawing the conclusions and implementing the necessary 
changes. The people from the CEO unit just assist; they never take over the 
responsibility (interview). 
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The other arena for interpretation was the six annual meetings with other 
department managers in the cross-departmental result support groups. These groups 
consisted of one “process-guide” from the CEO unit and 6-8 department managers put 
together from different functional sectors (see section 4.2). All managers interviewed 
emphasised the interpretative aspects of these groups.  
The first post [in the meeting], Mrs. Olsen said,  is the forthcoming monthly 
performance reports. We go through those quickly, “are you on course [on the PIs] 
or not”. And if you say “no”, we ask, “do you need help? Is there anything we can 
do?”. It can be high sick leave (…) or anything. So you see, we lift this manager’s 
problem in and discuss it together. And if the help from the managers in the group 
is not enough, the department writes in its monthly report to the CEO that it needs 
support. 
 Mrs. Wold, manager of the Culture and Sports department, said: 
I’ve received helpful advice from both the Technical department and even schools 
[laughs] (interview) 
Hypothesis 3 Revisited 
Where do these observations leave us in relation to hypothesis 3? First and foremost, 
the nil-hypothesis can be firmly rejected. The BSC-reform arguably brought all four 
departments studied into a significantly more active intrusiveness mode. The 
substantial differences in PIs aside, scanning activities were numerous and regular. 
Furthermore, all department managers engaged in extensive interpretation processes. 
 It is less clear, however, whether the more specific parts of hypothesis 3 were 
confirmed by the Larvik experience. Did Byskogen school and the Culture and Sports 
department end up in an “enacting” learning mode, and the Technical department in a 
“discovering” mode? According to Weick, one of the crucial differences between these 
two modes was their respective interpretation characteristics. Organisations in an 
enacting mode have unstandardised and inclusive interpretation processes; 
organisations in a discovering mode - standardised and exclusive. In Larvik, we have 
seen how these differences were eradicated by the CEO’s managerial interventions. 
All departments were obliged to engage in systematic and inclusive interpretation 
activities.  
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 What distinguishes these two learning modes in terms of scanning 
characteristics is the PIs used. Here Weick’s theory was in fact confirmed. Byskogen 
used few dials, and to the extent they did, they were tin-openers. The Technical 
department used several outcome dials. 
Nonetheless, the big picture is that Weick’s theory was most accurate in 
predicting the “vertical” movement in Figure 6 (p.45): All departments were brought 
from a passive to an active intrusiveness mode, if only to a slightly difference extent. 
The question to address now is why this change came about. 
Recall from section 2.4.1 (p.37ff) that Weick uses two explanatory components 
to explain why some organisations are in a passive and others in an active 
intrusiveness mode; one “static”, the other “dynamic”. The static component is 
variation in dependency upon the environment (Weick 2001:247). A heavily 
dependent organisation needs to intrude actively into its environment. The dynamic 
component is to what extent the managers are willing and able to keep the organisation 
in an active mode . Intrusiveness into the environment requires persistent interest and 
dedication to prioritise these activities, even in times of constrained resources. 
I will argue that these lines of argument to a great extent can explain the 
changes in learning behaviour in the Larvik departments. As for the “static” 
component, the CEO’s interventions clearly  made the departments more dependant 
upon their environments by greatly increasing the transparency in the municipality. As 
we have seen, data about the departments activities was obtained from numerous 
sources: PIs in the department plans, public feedback reports and annual surveys 
among staff and users. By institutionalising routines for performance reporting, 
meetings with upper management and not least the cross-departmental result support 
groups, the CEO “revealed” these data to the departments’ respective environments: 
political and administrative upper management, users, staff and peers (the other 
department managers).  
This latter point, concerning making performance visible for peers, is what 
Hood (1998) calls institutionalising mechanisms for peer-group review. The CEO in 
Larvik especially made use of such mechanisms in relation to schools. Three 
additional transparency-enhancing efforts were done in relation to this sector. First, the 
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CEO introduced an additional user survey for schools. Second, the 25 schools in the 
municipality were asked to compare performance on selected indicators not only 
among themselves, but even with schools in the neighbouring municipalities (cf. p.81). 
Third, the results from user surveys were given to the local newspaper, which in turn 
printed a “best in test”-article about the 25 schools (interviews with Mr. Gaustad and 
Mrs. Olsen) 
My understanding is that this increased dependency made the departments want 
to “influence” the way their environments perceived their work. Nobody wants to be 
perceived of as poor performers. This is evident in the managers’ active involvement 
in all arenas for interpretation, as well as in ever more active scanning activities. An 
example of the former is the school managers’ annual letters to parents where they 
explain how they intend to follow up on the results from user surveys (I.e. the head 
teachers give their interpretation of the revealed data) (p.80f). An example of the latter 
was the Technical department’s specified survey, following up a user survey that 
revealed a poor result. 
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Part 3 CONCLUSIONS AND 
IMPLICATIONS  
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6 Conclusions 
 
 
The overarching research question addressed in this thesis has been whether or not 
performance management can facilitate organisational intelligence in governmental 
organisations. The analysis was based on clinical research into a Norwegian local 
government experience in which the performance management-system “the Balanced 
Scorecard” (BSC) was implemented over a period of five years, 1996-2001. The thesis 
has narrated and compared the parallel change experiences of four functional units 
within the context of Larvik Municipality in Norway: the Technical department, the 
Culture and Sports department, the Work and Employment department and Byskogen 
primary school. Together, these departments cover a wide range of the public services 
provided by Norwegian municipalities.  
Informed by March and Olsen’s (1976) distinction between two fundamental 
processes of organisational intelligence, the analysis started from the following 
assumption: in order to fruitfully discuss the performance management doctrine, its 
ability to facilitate both fundamental processes of organisational intelligence had to be 
taken into account: management control is one, organisational learning the other.  
The first question addressed was whether management control was facilitated 
by the BSC-reform. The narration of the departments’ experiences showed that this 
was indeed the case. However, we also observed how management control can take 
many shapes. Macintosh’s (1985, 1994) contingency-framework helped us identify 
and make sense of important aspects of these differences. In the relation between 
upper management and the Technical departments, a “close” management practice 
emerged. This was a system with many, detailed and unambiguous controls; a system 
for close measuring and monitoring of most aspects of performance: outputs as well as 
outcome.  
In the case of Byskogen school, on the other hand,  no such system emerged. 
Here, measures of performance were few and ambiguous. Central features of 
Byskogen’s PI-system were measures of “structural effectiveness”, like data from user 
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and staff surveys. The CEO explained how this did not imply that control was absent. 
When you put several “ambiguous” measures together, he argued, you “get a   pretty 
good idea of what goes on in that school”. I.e., Byskogen’s PI-system facilitated 
“prospects-oriented” management control; a system that could be used by the CEO 
less as a tool for close measuring and monitoring than as a tool for evaluation, 
planning and estimation of future prospects. 
As for the other process of organisational intelligence, learning from 
experience, the departments’ experiences varied less. The narration showed how the 
BSC-reform over time brought all four departments studied into a substantially more 
active intrusiveness mode. This means that they actively and regularly scanned a range 
of sources in their respective environments for feedback about their performances, and 
subsequently made considerable efforts to make sense of it. Hence, the departments 
were given the opportunity to learn form their experiences.  
In fact, innovative interpretation activities were spurred in all four departments, 
not least in Byskogen, by arguably “ambiguous” data from e.g. surveys of staff and 
user satisfaction. The term used in this thesis for such indicators of performance is “tin 
openers”. By itself, a tin-opener provides only an incomplete and inaccurate picture. 
Such indicators do not give answers but prompt further interrogation and inquiry, or at 
least discussion. One example of a tin-opener PI could be a survey of client-
satisfaction with the level of service they meet in a given public office. Another, taken 
form the experience of the Work and Employment department in Larvik, is the 
percentage of benefit claimants that are transferred to paid occupation. 
 We have seen how discussions about the significance and implications of such 
data took place on multiple levels in Larvik: Between department managers and 
department staff; Between department managers and upper management in the 
municipality and, last but not least, between managers of different departments. 
One of the lessons that can be drawn from the Larvik experience is thus that in 
managing complex, decentralised governmental organisations, the BSC is a tool as 
much, if not more, attuned to facilitate the process of organisational learning as the 
process of management control. This strongly supports the conclusion drawn by 
Frieder Nachold (1996) in his treatment of OECD public sector reforms in the 1990s. 
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There, Naschold highlighted the importance of analytically focusing on the process of 
learning in evaluations of performance management. While we are all aware of the 
necessity of management control, Naschold argues, 
Successful reform projects point to a function of the new steering model which 
normally remains in the background: the (…)  importance of the interactive and 
decentralised negotiating process, [with] … continuous and targeted discussion 
and negotiation on targets, results and their conditions (…). In such a case, the 
new steering system is to be considered less as a [management control system] 
than as a suitable basis for collective and binding learning, experience and 
conciliation processes (Naschold 1996:9). 
 
Implications for Performance Indicators 
This conclusion has several implications for an important aspect of performance 
management; the question of what makes for good performance indicators. According 
to Neil Carter (1991), it is an established truth in the management accounting literature 
that the only good performance indicator (PI) is an unaboiguous PI. In this thesis I 
have denoted such PIs “dials”. A dial an un-challengable measure of a department’s 
performance; a PI that  provides a means of “stopping up excuses” on the part of 
subordinates. Most examples of dials from the Larvik experience comes from the 
Technical department. One example is the amount of bacteria in the drinking water.  
 We have seen how in Larvik, tin opener PIs proved just as valuable as dials in 
facilitating organisational intelligence, in that they often provided the basis for the 
process of learning. The Larvik experience thus forcefully challenges the “established 
truth” that only dials are good PIs. My assumption is that the establishment of this 
“truth” in the field of management accounting mirrors this field’s preoccupation with 
management control – corresponding with an underestimation of the other 
fundamental process of organisational intelligence, organisational learning  
 My “challenge” to that “truth” has a further implication. In the introduction to 
this thesis, Rombach (1991) was mentioned as one of the most proliferate Nordic 
critics of the performance management doctrine. His “death blow” is that performance 
management is not suited for the public sector, as it is built on a precondition that is 
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only valid in the private sector: the feasibility of identifying clear, quantified and 
unambiguous indicators of performance (Øgård 2000:35). This thesis has showed that 
this is in fact not a precondition for performance management. The experience of 
Byskogen school is perhaps illustration of the fact that performance management 
“runs” just fine on tin-openers PIs. Hence, Rombach’s critique misses the target. 
 
The Scope for Strategic Management in the Municipal Context 
By it’s “parents”, Kaplan and Norton, the Balanced Scorecard is presented as a tool for 
enhancing strategic management above all. The BSC-slogan is in fact “Translating 
strategy into action”. The Larvik experience illustrated that the BSC is in fact able to 
facilitate such “strategy-focusedness”, as a hierarchy of objectives did emerge. PIs for 
municipality-wide objectives were developed in all departments; incorporated into the 
management accounting system; and practised alongside the department-specific PIs.  
However, the experience also indicated that there are limits to the scope for 
strategic management in a decentralised, diversified organisation like a municipality. 
The thesis argues that the ability of the Balanced Scorecard to “translate strategy into 
action” in is dependant upon at least two things. The first is the strategies themselves.  
Structural measures like work environment, competence and co-operation are perhaps 
the smallest common denominators for agencies providing very different services.  
The second “qualification” is the design of the management process. When asked to 
explain their willingness to dedicate efforts to municipality-wide objectives, several of 
the managers emphasised the inclusive and democratic process that preceded them (cf. 
p.78,79). Whether “focus areas” dictated from above, either from the CEO or the 
politicians- would have been embraced in the same way remains unanswered.  
Style Matters 
This latter point leads us to the next and last lesson I draw from the Larvik experience: 
implementation and management style matters. Not forgetting the arguably multiple 
and substantial successes of the 1996-2001-reform in Larvik, make no mistake: the 
BSC is no magic formula. The management concept cannot be distinguished from its 
implementation. This is nowhere more visible than in the process of learning in 
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Larvik. We have seen how the CEO “tricked” the departments into a more active 
intrusiveness mode through a series of innovative interventions. E.g., by 
institutionalising routines for performance reporting, meetings with upper management 
and not least the cross-departmental result support groups, the CEO “revealed” 
important data about the  departments the their respective environments: political and 
administrative upper management, users, staff and peers. This made the departments 
seek more feedback, and dedicate efforts to interpret it (cf. p.98 above). 
The fact that both processes of organisational intelligence were facilitated in 
Larvik, as well as a notable degree of strategic management, is hence evidently due to 
a mixture of the BSC concept itself, a series of innovative managerial interventions 
and an inclusive management style.  
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